Friday, August 19, 2016

My interview with Zeinab Badawi for BBC HARDtalk


Zeinab Badawi speaks to Ismail Sezgin, director of the Centre for Hizmet Studies in the UK, an educational think tank founded by supporters of Fethullah Gulen. The Turkish government is continuing to hunt down people who it claims are followers of the reclusive US-based Turkish cleric. The government blames Gulen for the recent coup attempt and wants the US to extradite him to Turkey to stand trial. He denies involvement. Is the Gulenist movement a threat to the Turkish state?

Was Gulen behind the coup attempt in Turkey? (opinion)


Tuesday, July 19, 2016

Are there any Gulen supporters in judiciary?




I was asked whether there are Gulen supporters in Judiciary?

Newshour BBC world service

A short description of Hizmet movement

A short description of Hizmet.

What is Hizmet movement?

Who is Fethullah Gulen?

Sunday, December 14, 2014

What happenned to Zaman and Samanyolu TV (A short list of events)



12/23/2013       Turkey's flagship carrier Turkish Airlines (THY) stopped the distribution of the Zaman, Today's Zaman, Bugün and Ortadoğu dailies to business-class passengers on its planes on Monday without any explanation, though other dailies are still being handed out onboard.

1/6/2014           CHP Deputy Chairman Sezgin Tanrıkulu submitted a question in Parliament on Monday asking Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan why the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) has canceled its subscriptions to the Zaman and Bugün dailies.

2/7/2014           The deportation of Today's Zaman journalist Mahir Zeynalov for Twitter messages that were critical of the government is a setback for press freedom, say international press organizations

3/2/2014              The Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) has issued a warning over news program “Derin Bakış” (Deep View), which is broadcast on Samanyolu News TV, on the grounds that the program is “biased,” only a week after it penalized Bugün TV for the same reason.

3/25/2014            The Supreme Election Board (YSK) has issued a three-week broadcasting suspension for Bugün TV's news program “Özgür İfade” (Free Expression) and a four-week broadcasting suspension for another program on the same TV channel, “Gündem Özel” (Special Agenda), on the grounds that both have violated the equality of opportunity among political parties.

3/27/2014            The Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) has suspended 15 more programs of the Samanyolu Haber TV news channel, in addition to the suspension of 20 programs in mid-March, Samanyolu Broadcasting Group General Manager Hidayet Karaca said on Wednesday.

4/4/2014              On Thursday night Samanyolu Haber TV news channel was the latest to face a cyber attack, as readers have at times also recently been unable to access the websites of the dailies Zaman, Today's Zaman and Taraf, as well as the Cihan news agency, particularly since the night of the local elections on March 30.

5/28/2014            In Mardin, Hizmet movement's two radio channels were banned because they are allegedly a "threat to national security" 

6/4/2014              The Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTÜK) has been harassing TV networks that it deems to be anti-government, and Samanyolu TV has become one of its major targets.

6/5/2014              A prosecutor has filed charges against a director of Samanyolu TV accusing him of “insulting” and “slandering” Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and fomenting “grudges and hostility among the public,” demanding up to 11 years and two months in prison.

6/7/2014              Prime Minister Erdogan claimed that if "the December 17th plot" were successful, those who are not subscribed to Zaman daily will be purged from their posts by Hizmet operations

6/12/2014            Construction of Samanyolu Media Center building in Istanbul was halted without any reason

7/1/2014              The ruling AKP imposed a media accreditation ban on a number of outlets, including Taraf, Sözcü, Yurt, Birgün, Evrensel, Yeni Asya and Aydınlık dailies, as well as broadcasters Halk TV, Ulusal Kanal and Hayat TV, preventing them from covering a ceremony to announce Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's candidacy for the presidency on Tuesday.

7/10/2014            Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan urged people to boycott the Zaman media group while speaking in a rally in the Black Sea city of Tokat on Wednesday.

7/11/2014            The government reportedly held a secret meeting at the Finance Ministry in June to damage the credibility of 100,000 companies considered to be linked to the Hizmet movement, which were already being profiled by the government and refusing to obey the government's ill-motivated instructions, the Taraf daily claimed.

7/11/2014            Minutes before Friday's iftar, the breaking of the Ramadan fast, The municipal police of the AKP Üsküdar municipality forced a Samanyolu TV (STV) crew out of the mosque's garden, where they were shooting a Ramadan program, despite the crew having gained official permission from the authorities.

7/14/2014            A member of the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) has submitted a written parliamentary question demanding to know if 100,000 companies have been profiled by the National Police Department on the grounds that they are close to the Hizmet movement.


7/16/2014            Main opposition CHP Deputy Chairman Sezgin Tanrıkulu spoke in Parliament on Wednesday about the cancellation of the award ceremony of a short film contest after the competition was won by Seleme Gülen, a relative of Turkish Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen.

7/21/2014            The Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) fined Samanyolu TV on Sunday for running a news story about a student named Fethullah Gülen who prepared for the Transition to Higher Education Examination (YGS) with the Hizmet-affiliated Körfez University Preparation School in İzmir.

7/31/2014            Deputy Chairman of the AKP Suleyman Soylu woved to "exterminate" Hizmet movement activists

8/10/2014            A 35-year-old man has been killed in Yalova province by a drug addict on the grounds that the victim was a follower of the faith-based Hizmet movement, against which the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has declared battle since last year, and because he was a critic of Erdoğan.

8/19/2014            Independent and critical media outlets in Turkey -- including Zaman, the country's highest-circulation newspaper, and Cihan, the country's largest private news agency -- were denied accreditation to cover the ruling AKP extraordinary congress slated for Aug. 27.


8/22/2014            The Ministry of Education has blocked access to samanyoluhaber.com, a news website affiliated with the Hizmet movement, at institutions and organizations that are linked to the ministry.

9/18/2014            Reporters from the Zaman daily and the Cihan news agency were excluded from European Union Affairs Minister and chief EU negotiator Volkan Bozkır's press meeting in Brussels on Thursday

9/26/2014            Erdoğan’s men attack 2 journalists from Zaman, Bugün in US


9/26/2014            The Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) has fined the STV and Samanyolu Haber television stations 1 percent of their advertising revenues over their reports on a police officer who lost his wife and the couple's unborn baby after being arrested as part of a government-backed operation against members of the police force.

11/18/2014         Correspondents from the Zaman and Bugun newspapers, the Samanyolu TV station and Cihan news agency say they have been banned from the presidential palace since Erdogan’s inauguration in August and no longer receive official press releases


I have compiled media related facts from a wider report. Please read the full report from http://www.rethinkinstitute.org/persecution-hizmet-gulen-movement-turkey-chronicle/

Tuesday, August 19, 2014

GÜLEN AND POLITICS 1


GÜLEN AND POLITICS 1
In recent months, the well known scholar and preacher Fethullah Gülen has become a target for criticism from certain Turkish political figures. In this article, I will attempt to explain Gülen’s  position as regards political issues and how he has become a political instrument for the current government.
Historically, people with Islamic concerns have chosen different ways to survive (or struggle) with the secularist reforms of Kemalist Turkey. The early reforms laid down legislation that outlawed all Sufi orders and their activities (tariqas), and abolished most other religious organizations and committees, as well as denying access to or dismantling religious sites such as graveyards of the saints and Companions.
Under this strict ban, one set of religious groups either continued their activities in secret (the Qadiris, Naqshbandis and Mawlawis); a second set abolished their services (this included most of the Zaviyas and some other social centres such as food houses or asevleri).
Other scholars chose to take part in politics or the bureaucracy and to serve society as civil servants, mostly as heads of the newly established Diyanet institution (Religious Affairs).
A fourth set of scholars decided to stay away from the political sphere and bureaucracy and worked within society. Said Nursi, for instance, deliberately kept himself at a distance from politics and concentrated on writing and educating within the fields of Islamic theology and philosophy. Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan concentrated his efforts on teaching the Qur’an to the next generation. Both scholars managed to establish slow and steady community support for their causes and this transformed their communities into movements which later contributed to the development of Turkish society.
 Gülen and Politics
Fethullah Gülen  belongs to the same tradition as Nursi and Tunahan. Gülen  encouraged his listeners to undertake responsibility for three major needs within society, namely, the need for education, the need for dialogue and the need to give in charity. His choice to remain detached from active political life does not, however, mean that Gülen has ever been apolitical or anti-political. He has, in fact, always valued the right to vote as a citizen and encouraged people to take responsibility in elections by fulfilling their duty as citizens. He has also encouraged his listeners to use their rights as citizens and to take part in all sectors of life and society, be it public or private. One could therefore safely say that he is an individual who supports the political process as a duty of citizenship. What he has avoided himself and counselled those engaged in civil society projects to avoid is partisan politics.
Democracy 
Gülen’s position can be summarized as open support for democracy, as well as advocating a liberal secularism where people are free to exercise their religious or non-religious activities. He has consistently maintained an “equal distance from all political parties”, ensuring he was in conversation with all in an effort to serve society by always striving to gather support for the Hizmet movement’s education projects both in Turkey and abroad.
In 1995, when Gülen stated that “democracy is an inherent value of our culture”, political Islamists challenged and criticized him. For instance, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as a young politician and a representative of political Islamism, explained at that time how he saw democracies (and elections) as mere vehicles to assume power. In contrast to Gülen’s view of democracy as a modern reflection of a value with deep cultural roots, Erdoğan stated publicly that one should know where to get off the democracy train after reaching the desired “destination”.
The only time that Gülen has made a specific political appeal was when he called on his listeners to vote for greater freedoms in the referendum on reforming some articles in the constitution. The current constitution still reflects the fact that it was prepared by a military regime in 1982, and there have been many amendments during the long and slow process of the democratization of Turkey. Moreover, as it provides guidance for the further democratization of the country, Gülen is also in favour of Turkey’s European Union membership process.
Secularism
Gülen is in favour of secularism if it is defined as the religious freedom of the individual rather than state-controlled religion, the latter being the case in Turkey at present. He is confident that Islam can flourish comfortably in a free environment where no religion is favoured or oppressed. This form of secularism can be observed in the educational practice of Hizmet schools in Turkey and abroad.
Politics
To reiterate, Gülen is not against politics, nor a political system; however, he consciously refrains from involving himself in active politics where one seeks public support by elections to influence political life. Instead, Gülen prefers to concentrate on social projects within civil society and encourages voluntary public support for projects around education, dialogue and charity.
Political influence
Not being party-political is one thing, having political influence is another. As a public intellectual, Islamic scholar and philanthropist Gülen certainly has credibility and spiritual influence among the masses, giving him some incidental political influence. Gülen’s call for Muslims to take part in every sphere of life and his encouragement of the development of educational activities not only resulted in the establishment of the Hizmet Movement, but has also influenced and changed other religious movements and their modes of working. A prominent example of this is in Erdoğan’s apparent shifting of his political stance from Necmeddin Erbakan’s political Islamism (the views typical of the  Milli Görüs movement) towards that of a Muslim-democrat in 2002, the latter stance being more in line with Gülen than Erbakan.
Gülen’s followers are undeniably amongst the most educated religious community in Turkey. The majority of Gülen’s followers are university graduates with a very high number of them also holding post-graduate qualifications, and there are many of them who are professionals in various sectors, such as business, media, health, education, engineering and academia. The current Prime Minister, Erdoğan, is well aware of Gülen’s influence, and has, through the media, called upon Gülen to motivate his followers to support the government on several issues, including the Kurdish peace talks and the latest referendum.
Some degree of political influence can be rightly attributed to Gülen; however, with the March 29 local elections, it became evident that although the movement is still strong enough to survive and motivate participants, its political influence is limited.
Erdoğan now seems to have realised that the Hizmet movement, as a loose network of people with limited political influence, and Gülen, as a ‘silent opponent’, can be very useful as a political tool he can exploit to avoid corruption allegations and implement his own agenda in the “New Turkey”. He has increased the stridency of his tone and his efforts in such a way that they seem to target the Hizmet movement but his actual aim is clearly to redefine the future of Turkish democracy on his own terms. In this process, he is dividing conservative Muslim society in Turkey into two camps that he sees as “for us” and “against us”.
In my next article, I shall look further at how Gülen and Hizmet became a political tool for Erdoğan to frighten the voters and make it possible to legislate some of the most authoritarian laws in Turkey in recent months and the dangers of these events.


Monday, February 17, 2014

A power struggle? I think not! A personal response to a Guardian article

Photograph: Jivan Guner/EPA
Thoughts shared with the editor of The Guardian about a recent article covering the current political climate in Turkey.

Dear Editor,


I am emailing about the following article: Turkish police caught in middle of war between Erdoğan and former ally Gülen by Constanze Letsch on Sunday 9 February 2014. (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/09/turkish-police-fethullah-Gülen-network)

  

I am sorry to say that I found the article lacking in a number of important respects. I am emailing to provide feedback which I hope will be taken in the light that it is offered: honest, non-reactionary and genuine. I am a PhD researcher on Fethullah Gülen’s philosophy and recently submitted my thesis on Gülen’s moral responsibility theory.

For ease of reference I am detailing my critique in list form:-

  1.      The entire article is based on the argument that the Gülen-inspired Hizmet movement has infiltrated the police. The author is welcome to take this position if he or she so wishes of course. But given that this is a central argument/proposition of the article, should not the author dedicate at least a paragraph or two as to why he believes this narrative over the alternative - that is that there are Gülen sympathisers in the police force, that this is a statistical inevitability given that the movement is widespread and focuses on education but that there is no parallel decision making-process and that such officers cannot be suspect simply because they are Gülen inspired. What is important is whether or not they comply with the law, constitution and their own professional code of conduct.

2.      The entire article claims that the Hizmet movement has infiltrated the police and judiciary and are running these corruption investigations. These are serious allegations against a civil society movement comprising many people. Therefore, should not the author include what Gülen and the movement have to say about this? The article does not. This is not only deeply unfair to Gülen, the movement and officers inspired by Gülen but also to its readers who will not be informed of the movement’s rebuttal.


3.      The entire article claims that the Hizmet movement has infiltrated the police force and judiciary but does not include a single reference to the fact that Gülen was tried of this charge between 2000 and 2006. The charge against him was to head an organisation to infiltrate state structures - including the police. After the 6 year trial, Gülen was acquitted (not dismissed or dropped) of all charges in 2006. The prosecutor appealed and Gülen’s acquittal was upheld by the highest court of appeal in the land in 2008. What is more, this trial was conducted by a staunchly secular judiciary – a judiciary that convicted the AK Party in 2008 of being the centre of religious reactionarysm.

Given the central argument of the piece and the obvious relevance of the trial, why did the author not mention it in his article? If Gülen had been found guilty in 2006 of ‘infiltrating the state’, surely the author would have included that given that he’s included a Wikileak quote to the same effect. Is this not grossly unfair? It gives the strong impression that the author only includes what fits his narrative.

4.      The article does not state that so far 7,000 police officers and 300 prosecutors have been reassigned. It does not inform its readers that those reassigned (purged) did not face a single charge or disciplinary procedure before or after being reassigned. Surely that is important. If these people are guilty, then why reassign them to another province? Surely the thing to do is to ensure that they are removed from their post according to due process.

5.      The article does not state that those purged does not only include police officers and prosecutors running live corruption investigations but also police officers in any part of Turkey that could run investigations into government corruption (i.e. those attached to the organised crime unit). Clearly this is not about Gülen or Gülen inspired officers but about preventing any investigation into government corruption.

6.      The article draws a comparison between the ‘corruption investigations’ and ‘government purge’ of ‘Gülenists’ by quoting Ahmet Sik who says ‘There is also a real witchhunt going on. We have massive corruption on the one hand, but the investigation against it also violates democratic and judicial principles. It's a choice between a rock and a hard place, pest and cholera.’ The point being made is that the ‘corruption investigations’ and the ‘counter purges’ are both illegitimate. But the article does not say how? The corruption investigations were run by state prosecutors according to the law and overseen by court orders. How can that be compared to the mass scale government purge that has not sought to follow any judicial process or procedure whatsoever.

7.      The article states the dramatic and far-reaching ‘purges have been taking place more quietly for years. According to both Yilmaz and Gün, internal investigations have been conducted against tens of thousands of police officers over the past four years alone.’ The article does not address the anomaly here: if tens of thousands of Gülen-inspired officers have been purged from the police force for over the past four years (and before the current wave of reassignments), how can the Hizmet movement continue to wield such great power within the police force today to the degree that they can mount such massive government corruption investigations?

8.      The article is selective in that it refers to only part of Erdogan’s ‘this is a Gülenist coup’ claim. The article states that Erdogan believes that ‘Gülenists’ are behind the corruption investigations. But why does it omit the fact that Erdogan from the very beginning has claimed that this ‘Gülenist parallel state’ acts on behalf of an international coalition of powers. His advisers and MPs have named these powers explicitly as the US, Israel, Germany, UK, France etc.

9.      Curiously, the article does not state that the opposition political parties such as the left-wing Republican Peoples Party of the right wing National Action Party does not buy into Erdogan’s argument that the Hizmet movement is orchestrating these probes through its people in the police force. Why not? The author does not include a single rebuttal in the entire article that counters the claim that ‘Gülenists’ have infiltrated the police and are behind all this. Is that not odd?

10.   The articles does not query how these officers were identified as ‘Gülenist’ in the absence of any formal process. If we are to accept that these officers were purged for being ‘Gülenist’ then we must concede that they were profiled prior to these investigations. The author does not follow or even hint at this line of enquiry. 

11.   The article states that ‘[t]hose who dared to criticise the Gülen movement before were swiftly punished’ but does not state that to date over 44 anti-Gülen books have been published - over 25 between 2006 and 2011. If this argument was fair these authors would also have faced a similar treatment to that of Ahmet Sik. Why does the author not refer to this point at all? (Reference: Koç, D. (2011) Strategic Defamation Of Fethullah Gülen: English Vs. Turkish. European Journal of Economic and Political Studies, 4, pp.189–244.)


Most importantly, the article does not address the elephant in the room: that is that to prevent the corruption investigations the government is causing a Constitutional crisis to undermine the separation of powers in Turkey. This is the big story here and is completely missed. The author is welcome to dismiss it – but should he not have at least alerted his readers to this narrative.

My problem with the article is not that it takes a particular view. After all, it is an opinion piece and will do so. My concern is that the article makes very serious and grave allegations about a popular movement but does not state what they have to say about these claims. It takes one narrative without explaining why it has dismissed the alternative. It omits vital information that is highly relevant. Overall, this not only undermines the article but is also unfair to the author’s readers.


Yours kindly
Ismail Mesut Sezgin