Abundant accusations, little evidence

This article was first published: https://www.turkishminute.com/2016/09/15/opinion-abundant-accusations-little-evidence/

The Turkish media – or what is left of it – has already found Fethullah Gülen guilty of the coup attempt on July 15. When challenged about the evidence, the most common reply is “Come to Turkey and see” or “Everyone in Turkey thinks this way.” This almost unanimous opinion is not a coincidence, and it does imply a monopoly over the Turkish media rather than any objective fact.

Already, the Turkish media has moved on from the coup attempt and nowadays is trying to prove that everything that has gone wrong in Turkey is because of Gülen. TV commentators argue that Gülenists plotted against military officers in the Ergenekon case, but the next day an Ergenekon suspect is arrested for being a Gülenist. One main TV channel even introduced the cheat codes of famous computer game Grand Theft Auto V as secret codes of Gülenist coup planners. However, I will only concentrate on some of the credible (!) arguments.

Military involvement
The argument that Gülen and the Hizmet movement were involved in the coup is shaped around accusations, not evidence. In the first instance, while the coup was still under way Erdoğan accused Gülen of being behind it. Yet, in his own words at that point he had been unable to contact the chief intelligence officer or the chief of general staff. He claimed he had not been briefed before the broadcast he made to the nation, and he didn’t know anything about the coup attempt until his brother-in-law rang him on the evening of July 15. It is hard to pin down when exactly this call happened as Erdoğan gives three different times in three different interviews.

Media channels and TV commentators then started to broadcast this and other accusations, especially in Turkey but also in some foreign media outlets. The most notable accusation comes from Chief of General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar. He claims that one putschist (Hakan Evrim) offered to put him in touch with Gülen by phone. However, Evrim denies this allegation in his own statement and gives an entirely different story. Is there any evidence at all to support Akar’s claim? Does Evrim have Gülen’s contact details in his phone? Did he ring him? What could be the motive for an officer to try to connect Gülen to the coup at a time when it had already been thwarted (at around 8 a.m. the following morning)?

There are more questions about Akar’s statement. First of all, Akar’s statement is contradicted by three other people who were in the room. Secondly, Akar’s own involvement in the coup is not clear. Thirdly, are the putschists trying to cover their tracks by directing it to a more “convenient scapegoat”? It is plausible that Akar, who is known as a staunch Kemalist, is choosing to comply with Erdoğan’s narrative and clear his own name while supporting further purges of Gülenists.

Levent Türkkan’s confession is also important. He was the aide to the chief of general staff and claims he received orders from Gülenists. However, this “confession” was presented to the media with a photograph in which Türkkan shows signs of having been tortured. Rather than supporting the accusations, the photograph of Türkkan tends to destroy their credibility. If he was indeed tortured, it shows how far some people are willing to go to pin the coup on Gülen.

Türkkan’s photo and reports from Amnesty International raise serious concerns about how reliable accusations can be if the Turkish security forces are using torture to get information or confessions. Also, after the post-coup purge of some 3,000 judges and prosecutors, how fair can the judiciary be? Is it possible that some putschists are being persuaded to cut a deal with prosecutors by giving statements in line with Erdoğan’s narrative in exchange for a pardon?

Brig, Gen. Fatih Celaleddin Sağır’s statement raises still more questions. He says, “I had been going to the [Gülen organization’s] houses and dormitories between 1988 and 1992, attending all their gatherings. I had served the Gülen organization for 10 years. After 2007, especially with the Sledgehammer and Ergenekon operations, I started to move away. I suspended my relationship with them.” First of all, can it be true that a general was able to go regularly to Gülen dormitories and remain within the Kemalist military during a period in which anyone with the slightest inclination towards Gülen or any other religious group would be immediately dismissed? Secondly, even if it is true that he was a Gülen sympathizer in the past, he claims to have left the movement 10 years before the time of the attempted coup. Isn’t the question: So who are you working with now?

Police involvement
It ıs reported that three police officers were captured during the coup. Yet the number of police officers reported to have been purged for Gülenist affiliations before the coup was more than 4,000. If only three of them took part in the coup, then it means that the Hizmet movement did not take part; otherwise, their numbers would have been much greater. Even if we take a close look only at the individuals involved, the accusations do not hold. For example, Mithat Ayrancı was dismissed from the police force for being a Gülenist in 2014, but he took the matter to court, which ruled there was no evidence supporting the accusations against him and ordered his reinstatement. The government did not abide by the court’s decision and he was not reinstated. So there is evidence that Ayrancı justifiably resented his treatment by Erdoğan and the ruling party, but no proof at all that he was a Gülenist.

Questionable link
The most important question mark about the coup attempt concerns a theology professor, Adil Öksüz. He was arrested in a village called Kazancı near the Akıncı air base. The claim is that he is the link between the army and Gülen. However, he said that he was there “to buy land” in the village. He was held in custody for two days and released after his initial statement. Now there is a warrant for his arrest.

At a time when possession of a single book by Gülen or a debit card from BankAsya or even buying credit for your phone from a shop owner known to be a Gülen sympathizer Is enough reason for arrest, it is strange that an individual held to be key to the coup plot can be released and allowed to disappear. It’s even stranger that the judges who ordered his release are not among those purged while so many others have been arrested for having a bank account at BankAsya or subscribing to the Zaman daily.

Missing facts
While accusations are flying about individuals, a great deal of hard evidence is lacking on the actual organization of the coup attempt. Where are the operation plans? Where are the camera records of military HQ and the Akıncı base? What about the phone communications between the putschist generals? What about the GPS traces of all the accused parties such as Adil Öksüz and Akin Öztürk?

It is a stretch to conclude that the coup attempt had anything to do with Gülen or his supporters; if it were, we would have seen many more Gülenists taking part in events.

Very few of the putschists stated any affiliation with Gülen and in fact most confessed to having other secular or Kemalist affiliations. All the important questions still remain unanswered, but the pro-government media goes on rubbing the same few confessions in our face.

*Doctor of philosophy, Director of Centre for Hizmet Studies

GÜLEN AND POLITICS 1

GÜLEN AND POLITICS 1

In recent months, the well known scholar and preacher Fethullah Gülen has become a target for criticism from certain Turkish political figures. In this article, I will attempt to explain Gülen’s  position as regards political issues and how he has become a political instrument for the current government.

Historically, people with Islamic concerns have chosen different ways to survive (or struggle) with the secularist reforms of Kemalist Turkey. The early reforms laid down legislation that outlawed all Sufi orders and their activities (tariqas), and abolished most other religious organizations and committees, as well as denying access to or dismantling religious sites such as graveyards of the saints and Companions.

Under this strict ban, one set of religious groups either continued their activities in secret (the Qadiris, Naqshbandis and Mawlawis); a second set abolished their services (this included most of the Zaviyas and some other social centres such as food houses or asevleri).

Other scholars chose to take part in politics or the bureaucracy and to serve society as civil servants, mostly as heads of the newly established Diyanet institution (Religious Affairs).

A fourth set of scholars decided to stay away from the political sphere and bureaucracy and worked within society. Said Nursi, for instance, deliberately kept himself at a distance from politics and concentrated on writing and educating within the fields of Islamic theology and philosophy. Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan concentrated his efforts on teaching the Qur’an to the next generation. Both scholars managed to establish slow and steady community support for their causes and this transformed their communities into movements which later contributed to the development of Turkish society.

 Gülen and Politics

Fethullah Gülen  belongs to the same tradition as Nursi and Tunahan. Gülen  encouraged his listeners to undertake responsibility for three major needs within society, namely, the need for education, the need for dialogue and the need to give in charity. His choice to remain detached from active political life does not, however, mean that Gülen has ever been apolitical or anti-political. He has, in fact, always valued the right to vote as a citizen and encouraged people to take responsibility in elections by fulfilling their duty as citizens. He has also encouraged his listeners to use their rights as citizens and to take part in all sectors of life and society, be it public or private. One could therefore safely say that he is an individual who supports the political process as a duty of citizenship. What he has avoided himself and counselled those engaged in civil society projects to avoid is partisan politics.

Democracy 

Gülen’s position can be summarized as open support for democracy, as well as advocating a liberal secularism where people are free to exercise their religious or non-religious activities. He has consistently maintained an “equal distance from all political parties”, ensuring he was in conversation with all in an effort to serve society by always striving to gather support for the Hizmet movement’s education projects both in Turkey and abroad.

In 1995, when Gülen stated that “democracy is an inherent value of our culture”, political Islamists challenged and criticized him. For instance, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as a young politician and a representative of political Islamism, explained at that time how he saw democracies (and elections) as mere vehicles to assume power. In contrast to Gülen’s view of democracy as a modern reflection of a value with deep cultural roots, Erdoğan stated publicly that one should know where to get off the democracy train after reaching the desired “destination”.

The only time that Gülen has made a specific political appeal was when he called on his listeners to vote for greater freedoms in the referendum on reforming some articles in the constitution. The current constitution still reflects the fact that it was prepared by a military regime in 1982, and there have been many amendments during the long and slow process of the democratization of Turkey. Moreover, as it provides guidance for the further democratization of the country, Gülen is also in favour of Turkey’s European Union membership process.

Secularism

Gülen is in favour of secularism if it is defined as the religious freedom of the individual rather than state-controlled religion, the latter being the case in Turkey at present. He is confident that Islam can flourish comfortably in a free environment where no religion is favoured or oppressed. This form of secularism can be observed in the educational practice of Hizmet schools in Turkey and abroad.

Politics

To reiterate, Gülen is not against politics, nor a political system; however, he consciously refrains from involving himself in active politics where one seeks public support by elections to influence political life. Instead, Gülen prefers to concentrate on social projects within civil society and encourages voluntary public support for projects around education, dialogue and charity.

Political influence

Not being party-political is one thing, having political influence is another. As a public intellectual, Islamic scholar and philanthropist Gülen certainly has credibility and spiritual influence among the masses, giving him some incidental political influence. Gülen’s call for Muslims to take part in every sphere of life and his encouragement of the development of educational activities not only resulted in the establishment of the Hizmet Movement, but has also influenced and changed other religious movements and their modes of working. A prominent example of this is in Erdoğan’s apparent shifting of his political stance from Necmeddin Erbakan’s political Islamism (the views typical of the  Milli Görüs movement) towards that of a Muslim-democrat in 2002, the latter stance being more in line with Gülen than Erbakan.

Gülen’s followers are undeniably amongst the most educated religious community in Turkey. The majority of Gülen’s followers are university graduates with a very high number of them also holding post-graduate qualifications, and there are many of them who are professionals in various sectors, such as business, media, health, education, engineering and academia. The current Prime Minister, Erdoğan, is well aware of Gülen’s influence, and has, through the media, called upon Gülen to motivate his followers to support the government on several issues, including the Kurdish peace talks and the latest referendum.

Some degree of political influence can be rightly attributed to Gülen; however, with the March 29 local elections, it became evident that although the movement is still strong enough to survive and motivate participants, its political influence is limited.

Erdoğan now seems to have realised that the Hizmet movement, as a loose network of people with limited political influence, and Gülen, as a ‘silent opponent’, can be very useful as a political tool he can exploit to avoid corruption allegations and implement his own agenda in the “New Turkey”. He has increased the stridency of his tone and his efforts in such a way that they seem to target the Hizmet movement but his actual aim is clearly to redefine the future of Turkish democracy on his own terms. In this process, he is dividing conservative Muslim society in Turkey into two camps that he sees as “for us” and “against us”.

In my next article, I shall look further at how Gülen and Hizmet became a political tool for Erdoğan to frighten the voters and make it possible to legislate some of the most authoritarian laws in Turkey in recent months and the dangers of these events.

A power struggle? I think not! A personal response to a Guardian article

Photograph: Jivan Guner/EPA

Photograph: Jivan Guner/EPA

Thoughts shared with the editor of The Guardian about a recent article covering the current political climate in Turkey.

Dear Editor,

I am emailing about the following article: Turkish police caught in middle of war between Erdoğan and former ally Gülen by Constanze Letsch on Sunday 9 February 2014. (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/09/turkish-police-fethullah-Gülen-network)

  

I am sorry to say that I found the article lacking in a number of important respects. I am emailing to provide feedback which I hope will be taken in the light that it is offered: honest, non-reactionary and genuine. I am a PhD researcher on Fethullah Gülen’s philosophy and recently submitted my thesis on Gülen’s moral responsibility theory.

For ease of reference I am detailing my critique in list form:-

  1.      The entire article is based on the argument that the Gülen-inspired Hizmet movement has infiltrated the police. The author is welcome to take this position if he or she so wishes of course. But given that this is a central argument/proposition of the article, should not the author dedicate at least a paragraph or two as to why he believes this narrative over the alternative - that is that there are Gülen sympathisers in the police force, that this is a statistical inevitability given that the movement is widespread and focuses on education but that there is no parallel decision making-process and that such officers cannot be suspect simply because they are Gülen inspired. What is important is whether or not they comply with the law, constitution and their own professional code of conduct.

2.      The entire article claims that the Hizmet movement has infiltrated the police and judiciary and are running these corruption investigations. These are serious allegations against a civil society movement comprising many people. Therefore, should not the author include what Gülen and the movement have to say about this? The article does not. This is not only deeply unfair to Gülen, the movement and officers inspired by Gülen but also to its readers who will not be informed of the movement’s rebuttal.

3.      The entire article claims that the Hizmet movement has infiltrated the police force and judiciary but does not include a single reference to the fact that Gülen was tried of this charge between 2000 and 2006. The charge against him was to head an organisation to infiltrate state structures - including the police. After the 6 year trial, Gülen was acquitted (not dismissed or dropped) of all charges in 2006. The prosecutor appealed and Gülen’s acquittal was upheld by the highest court of appeal in the land in 2008. What is more, this trial was conducted by a staunchly secular judiciary – a judiciary that convicted the AK Party in 2008 of being the centre of religious reactionarysm.

Given the central argument of the piece and the obvious relevance of the trial, why did the author not mention it in his article? If Gülen had been found guilty in 2006 of ‘infiltrating the state’, surely the author would have included that given that he’s included a Wikileak quote to the same effect. Is this not grossly unfair? It gives the strong impression that the author only includes what fits his narrative.

4.      The article does not state that so far 7,000 police officers and 300 prosecutors have been reassigned. It does not inform its readers that those reassigned (purged) did not face a single charge or disciplinary procedure before or after being reassigned. Surely that is important. If these people are guilty, then why reassign them to another province? Surely the thing to do is to ensure that they are removed from their post according to due process.

5.      The article does not state that those purged does not only include police officers and prosecutors running live corruption investigations but also police officers in any part of Turkey that could run investigations into government corruption (i.e. those attached to the organised crime unit). Clearly this is not about Gülen or Gülen inspired officers but about preventing any investigation into government corruption.

6.      The article draws a comparison between the ‘corruption investigations’ and ‘government purge’ of ‘Gülenists’ by quoting Ahmet Sik who says ‘There is also a real witchhunt going on. We have massive corruption on the one hand, but the investigation against it also violates democratic and judicial principles. It's a choice between a rock and a hard place, pest and cholera.’ The point being made is that the ‘corruption investigations’ and the ‘counter purges’ are both illegitimate. But the article does not say how? The corruption investigations were run by state prosecutors according to the law and overseen by court orders. How can that be compared to the mass scale government purge that has not sought to follow any judicial process or procedure whatsoever.

7.      The article states the dramatic and far-reaching ‘purges have been taking place more quietly for years. According to both Yilmaz and Gün, internal investigations have been conducted against tens of thousands of police officers over the past four years alone.’ The article does not address the anomaly here: if tens of thousands of Gülen-inspired officers have been purged from the police force for over the past four years (and before the current wave of reassignments), how can the Hizmet movement continue to wield such great power within the police force today to the degree that they can mount such massive government corruption investigations?

8.      The article is selective in that it refers to only part of Erdogan’s ‘this is a Gülenist coup’ claim. The article states that Erdogan believes that ‘Gülenists’ are behind the corruption investigations. But why does it omit the fact that Erdogan from the very beginning has claimed that this ‘Gülenist parallel state’ acts on behalf of an international coalition of powers. His advisers and MPs have named these powers explicitly as the US, Israel, Germany, UK, France etc.

9.      Curiously, the article does not state that the opposition political parties such as the left-wing Republican Peoples Party of the right wing National Action Party does not buy into Erdogan’s argument that the Hizmet movement is orchestrating these probes through its people in the police force. Why not? The author does not include a single rebuttal in the entire article that counters the claim that ‘Gülenists’ have infiltrated the police and are behind all this. Is that not odd?

10.   The articles does not query how these officers were identified as ‘Gülenist’ in the absence of any formal process. If we are to accept that these officers were purged for being ‘Gülenist’ then we must concede that they were profiled prior to these investigations. The author does not follow or even hint at this line of enquiry. 

11.   The article states that ‘[t]hose who dared to criticise the Gülen movement before were swiftly punished’ but does not state that to date over 44 anti-Gülen books have been published - over 25 between 2006 and 2011. If this argument was fair these authors would also have faced a similar treatment to that of Ahmet Sik. Why does the author not refer to this point at all? (Reference: Koç, D. (2011) Strategic Defamation Of Fethullah Gülen: English Vs. Turkish. European Journal of Economic and Political Studies, 4, pp.189–244.)

Most importantly, the article does not address the elephant in the room: that is that to prevent the corruption investigations the government is causing a Constitutional crisis to undermine the separation of powers in Turkey. This is the big story here and is completely missed. The author is welcome to dismiss it – but should he not have at least alerted his readers to this narrative.

My problem with the article is not that it takes a particular view. After all, it is an opinion piece and will do so. My concern is that the article makes very serious and grave allegations about a popular movement but does not state what they have to say about these claims. It takes one narrative without explaining why it has dismissed the alternative. It omits vital information that is highly relevant. Overall, this not only undermines the article but is also unfair to the author’s readers.

Yours kindly

Ismail Mesut Sezgin

Mavi Marmara and Gülen's critics: politics and principles

Illustration: Cem Kızıltuğ

Those who consider the current corruption investigations as a shadow war between Turkish Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan trace the breaking away of Gülen's support for Erdoğan specifically to the Gaza flotilla incident.

I don't believe there was ever an alliance between Gülen and Erdoğan of the type imagined by some commentators, far less that this incident was the cause of the split/separation of that alliance.
Gülen, who may be considered to have derived his interpretive framework from civil/cultural Islam, supported the Justice and Development Party's (AK Party) democratization efforts and benefited from the resultant freedoms that this process brought about. The flotilla incident can, however, be useful in demonstrating the difference of Gülen's mindset from political Islam.

What happened?

On May 27, 2010, a flotilla commissioned by the Humanitarian Aid Foundation (İHH) sailed towards Gaza. Its organizers said they sought to raise awareness of the unjust blockade imposed by the Israeli government by breaking the blockade and delivering humanitarian aid to those in need. The flotilla was raided in international waters by Israeli commandos, killing eight Turkish civilians and one Turkish-American. Turkey responded angrily, and a sequence of reactions followed, including Turkey's foreign minister claiming that this was “Turkey's 9/11,” and the Turkish government recalling its ambassador from Israel and declaring the Israeli ambassador persona non grata.
The atmosphere was very tense, and Turkey threatened to send another flotilla -- this time escorted by Turkish warships. Turkey seemed to be heading towards an all-out war with Israel.
Gülen commented on this incident when a journalist from the Wall Street Journal visited to take photographs for a pre-arranged interview already conducted through email. These comments caused a considerable reaction against Gülen at the time they were made and have resurfaced once again.

What did Gülen say on the flotilla incident?

Gülen's comments concerning the flotilla incident were not necessarily harsh, but they were labeled as surprising and even shocking by some.
Gülen's first comment about the Mavi Marmara incident  -- in which eight Turkish civilians and one Turkish-American were killed by Israeli troops as the boat carried humanitarian aid to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip -- was quite straightforward. He said: “What I saw was not pretty. It was ugly." Most people, I am sure, would agree that it was in fact ugly. There isn't much to elaborate on regarding this comment.
The more direct criticism that Gülen made was concerning the organizers (İHH). He said the organizers' failure to seek an accord with Israel before attempting to deliver aid "is a sign of defying authority, and will not lead to fruitful matters."
This statement has been criticized harshly in the Turkish media. Many columnists and journalists took this as Gülen's criticism of the İHH for not ensuring the relevant permission was obtained from the authorities (which in this case was the Israeli state). Thus they concluded that Gülen believed the incident was ugly and that the İHH was responsible for the devastating outcome as they had not sought permission from Israel. I believe this is a false assumption and an inaccurate conclusion about Gülen's statements. Let us revisit the incident.
Gülen chooses to believe this campaign was established to take aid supplies to needy people in Gaza. He dismisses the political side of the issue, which is apparently much more important than an aid campaign. The Mavi Marmara was designed to raise awareness of the plight of the Palestinians and put pressure on Israeli authorities to lift the blockade on the Gaza Strip. The organizers managed to motivate a significant number of international activists and thereby involve as many states as possible, just in case any problem arose.
Personally, I think the political aims were of greater importance than the charitable goals in this campaign. However, Gülen neither takes this stance nor does he make mention of this; he simply suggests that “if you want to take aid supplies to a country, you should seek accordance with the authorities in that country.”
Following on Gülen's third comment, we see that he places a distance between himself and the organizers and claims that they might have been politicized.
This is an important point. It is widely accepted that any charity that wants to operate around the world should be careful about their involvement in the domestic politics of any country. This often becomes a red line for charities, and they should not involve themselves with politics and political purposes. For instance, the Charity Commission in the United Kingdom has very clear guidelines for charities to follow. It clearly defines political purpose and political activity as being beyond the scope of charities and charitable organizations (Charity Commission, 2008).
Similarly, Gülen, in this case, preferred to be distant from a campaign and its organizers in which he believed the organizers may have been politicized. I don't believe our emotional reactions should shadow this reality. The İHH chose to divert some of its energy to contribute towards a political solution for the Gaza Strip. Although this can be perceived as a noble choice, one should accept that it changes the nature of the campaign from charity to politics, or at the very least, blurs the aim. I believe in such a case; Gülen has a right to distance himself from this choice.
Gülen added that assigning blame in the matter is best left to the United Nations, which shows his respect for international bodies.

The influence of these comments

Gülen's comments have been interpreted as “siding with Israel” and against the flotilla. Many people, including some Hizmet movement members, thought that Gülen was either misinformed (or less informed) about the topic and that he should make a further statement or retract his comments. However, Gülen insisted on his point, and this was a shock for some and for others confusion. It definitely reduced the political tension among the Hizmet movement members, but it also created a lot of anger and disappointment among nationalists and Milli Görüş (political Islamists) members.
In my opinion, this incident provides one of the most important pieces of evidence that show the difference between the “political Islamist perspective” in Turkey and the “civil Islam” that the Hizmet movement seems to represent. Political Islamism strongly advocated a military response, while the civil Islam representatives were a bit more cautious before they reacted. Gülen prefers to stay away from politics, while political Islamism willingly champions a political cause even in the guise of charity.
To demonstrate my point, I will try to analyze some of the principles that Gülen and the Hizmet movement follow. This, I believe, will show that Gülen's comments were not political but clearly based on his own Hizmet principles.

The principles and integrity

It will be helpful to go over some of these principles and see where the difference between Gülen and the İHH lies. I also recognize the fact that these comments are about the way the campaign was organized rather than its core meaning (charity). In the very same article, Gülen tells us that he gave the same advice regarding methods to be employed when having charitable aims to another charity, Kimse Yok Mu, which delivers aid to the needy people in Gaza as well as other parts of the world.

Positive contribution

First, the flotilla was against the “positive contribution" principle that Gülen frequently emphasizes. Although the flotilla had set out to take aid to the Gaza Strip and to Palestinians who had been under a blockade for a long time, the operation was mainly aimed at creating awareness of the blockade or to impose pressure for a political solution to the blockade. An aid mission should aim to make the situation better rather than worse. In this case, defying the Israeli authorities and trying to force them to do something would not "lead to fruitful matters." This aid campaign did not contribute positively to the situation in Gaza but created nine additional direct victims, great injury, many more indirect victims (the families who lost loved ones) and new hostilities between Turkey and Israel. Thus, I think the flotilla's overall contribution is not greater than its negative outcomes.
Related to this principle, Gülen described such a scenario in one of his books, in which he argued that nobody has a right to perform an act of "heroism" (kahramanlik) at the expense of creating further troubles for others. He suggested avoiding any action that will not contribute towards solution of an issue but may create further problems.

Non-political activism

Another point that Gülen has criticized is that the İHH might have been politicized while organizing this aid campaign. Gülen believes that virtuous actions should be, ideally, carried out for the right reasons using the right methods. In this case, the political aims and outcomes of this flotilla are not clear, and this is a good reason for Gülen to distance himself from it. Gülen thinks that people have a responsibility to calculate the outcomes of their actions (especially in a highly political dispute such as the Israeli-Palestine conflict) and carry out their actions appropriately.

Law of the land

Gülen also believes that people should try to be respectful of the law of the land. When they do not agree with the law, then they should use democratic, peaceful and non-violent methods to change it without oppressing any other people while they are seeking their rights.

Respect for the ‘other'

Another relevant principle is Gülen's call for respect for the "other." As responsible people, according to Gülen, we should be looking for ways to achieve our aims that do not impose force on another but instead show respect for all people, their identity and their beliefs. The claim of respect for the "other" is generally accepted by everybody, but we tend to forget this principle when we are dealing with people with whom we do not agree.

Balance of action and outcomes

Another principle that is related to respect for the other is to separate struggle (in work or service) from achievement. Each person has a moral responsibility to do his best in order to achieve a moral goal but, according to Gülen, we are not responsible for creating outcomes; we are only responsible for working to achieve them.
Our efforts may not bring a successful outcome, but this does not mean that we should give up doing the right thing. In such a case, the right thing is to do your best to try to solve a problem in an area step by step. In this way, we may not bring a solution to a problem, but we can try to contribute to a solution using positive contribution (musbet hareket) methods rather than worsening the situation.

Legitimate goals with legitimate means

Gülen also suggests that legitimate goals should be pursued by legitimate means. The involvement of civil society in international politics, in international matters is limited and also is bound by the laws of each country. Requesting a state to change some of its policies may be a legitimate demand, but it should be pursued using legitimate means.

Responsibility of action and outcomes

Gülen has also claimed on many occasions that a moral agent is responsible for the outcomes of his actions. Gülen claims that the accountability may even include the unintended outcomes of an action. He refers to a verse in the Quran which claims that people will be confronted with things they had not taken into account (Surah Az-Zumar, 39;47). The organizers, although they may not have wished to cause some of the outcomes, still have some responsibility to bear as well as the other party responsible for the incident.

Civil Islam and political Islamism are different

In light of the above, I believe Gülen's response to the flotilla is consistent with his Hizmet principles. In other words, had Gülen's response to the Mavi Marmara incident been any different, this would have contradicted the main principles of Hizmet. Had he chosen to support the political outcomes of the flotilla, regardless of his own teachings, he may have gained some public support in the short term; however, he would have dismissed his own principles and would lose his ethical standards in the long term.
These comments also show that Gülen was able to have an individual opinion about a public debate and also express his opinions freely. Although these comments were not welcomed by the political authority, Gülen maintained his position and did not retract his comments. It is important that we can accommodate this as a sign of plurality in a democratic society.
What is more, Gülen follows the long-standing practice of previous Islamic scholars by offering independent views with political implications while remaining independent of any political party and ideology.
This incident also shows the difference between Gülen's and Erdoğan's vision, Milli Görüş and the Hizmet movement's philosophy, as well as the methodological difference between the Kimse Yok Mu charity and the İHH. If we want to understand what is really happening, we should get used to the fact that there are important differences between representatives that come from civil Islam and political Islam traditions in Turkey.

This article was published at TodaysZaman (16 January 2014)

http://www.todayszaman.com/news-336777-mavi-marmara-and-gulens-critics-politics-and-principles-by-ismail-mesut-sezgin-.html

Pope’s Resignation, Responsible Leadership and Gülen

Pope’s Resignation and Responsibility

Pope Benedict XVI’s decision to resign from his position came as a shock to the world. Standing down from the papacy has only happened six times in recorded history and this resignation in itself is a first in six hundred years.

The Pope is a religious authority representing the head of the Catholic Church according to Catholic doctrine. The Church maintains that the doctrine on faith and morals that it presents as definitive, remains infallible.  The Pope represents the Church as the infallible authority and now he has resigned.

I am sure Pope Benedict’s resignation has been a good example of responsible leadership, and will continue to be the topic of many discussions in many circles around the globe. 

For me personally, this incident has triggered some questions and some points of discussion which differ somewhat in their content, however, they are of no lesser importance to followers of the Hizmet Movement.  My research on the Hizmet movement and more specifically Gülen’s responsibility teachings, led me to pose the question: 

Can Fethullah Gülen Resign?

I am aware that many would not perceive this question to be relevant in many aspects to the Pope’s resignation, especially as it doesn’t expect readers to compare the two religious groups. However, it does have a very vital point in terms of exploring the definition of responsibility and its interpretation.

There is the clear distinction of course, Gülen is not appointed or instructed by anyone to carry out the work and activities that he is engaged in, therefore, he doesn’t really hold a position (or a title) from which it would be possible for him to resign.  There are those who may conclude the fact that being a social movement leader results in taking a position by default, however, this is in fact not accurate in terms of responsibilities.

Gülen has consistently and constantly thought deeply concerning human responsibilities throughout his lifetime of service.  He has always advocated that human beings are a responsible agent on Earth and that responsibility is not only defined by prescribed prayers but with the role of “Khilafa/ vicegerency” as well. This role of vicegerency (which simply means representing God on Earth according to Islamic teachings) suggests that every human being is sent as an agent of God to Earth. These agents are responsible to carry out their prescribed duties as well as responding to their social and environmental duties. God Himself will be a judge and He will ask every human being to give an account of his/her achievements (or failures) on their mission. This simple idea explains the nature of existence and purpose for Muslims and their responsibilities in this world and accountability in the Hereafter.

The mission is a lifetime test (imtihan) and nobody has the authority to finish the test earlier than the time which is prescribed for them.  So, as long as a human being is sane (not insane) and has freedom of choice, he or she remains in this test until they meet their death.  Death is the designated end of the test and it is forbidden for a Muslim to commit suicide and end his test with his will.

The result of vicegerency is that human beings are burdened with this trust (emanet) which they are supposed to carry throughout their lifetime.

Thus, Gülen doesn't have the option to halt his responsibilities and resign from his position. It is his test to continue advising and teaching people and responding to their requests all as a part of his ultimate responsibility towards God. He is responsible to use all his capacity (mental and physical) in order to fulfil his responsibilities.

He continues, with the additional responsibilities that come with being a leader (imam) of a community as well. This increases his responsibilities further.

Responsible Leadership and Gülen

Responsible leadership, according to the simplest of definitions, is about making decisions that, after taking in to consideration the interests of the shareholders, also takes into account all other stakeholders, such as workers, clients, suppliers, the environment, the community and the  generations yet to come[1].  This concept has a similar, and in fact, almost identical equivalent in Islam. If a person causes goodness to happen, then he becomes morally praiseworthy for that goodness; and similarly, if a person effects something negative to happen, he is morally responsible for his part. (A verse in the Quran[2] stresses this point in the fourth chapter and it is reaffirmed through the hadith which states, “the one who causes is like the one who makes it himself”). 

As a renowned figure, Gülen’s action or inaction can result in positive or negative repercussions for his followers – it is for this additional reason that he must take due consideration and ensure he is even more cautious and ultimately responsible with all his actions. Thus, a resignation or even a slowing down in Gülen’s account could cause stagnation within his followers and he would become responsible for that outcome. As a leader of his community, he can’t afford to cause such stagnation within the movement.

In my opinion, Gulen won’t be returning to Turkey for the same reason. If he was to return to his country at this point it would create a domino effect in the movement. Most of the teachers who migrated to different parts of the world for service would be affected by Gülen’s return. Their opinions on migration would inevitably affected by this.  Some may start thinking that migration (hijra) for service is temporary and not something which is required throughout one’s lifetime.  In the same manner, if Gülen was to continue his work and stay in the USA, or any other country for that matter, it will continue to create a positive emphasis on sustainable service around the world among his followers.

In conclusion, it seems that Gülen is burdened with vicegerency as well as the additional responsibilities as a requirement of his “responsible leadership” and therefore, in my opinion, he has no option but to continue to the best of his capabilities.  The only exception to this ‘forced’ continuation, however, is if Gulen believes that his existence or participation is becoming a burden on the service that is being carried out around the world.  If this was the case, then I believe Gulen  would consider taking retirement as his natural responsibility  (as he has already attempted to do on a number of occasions[3]).

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[1] http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=responsible-leadership

[2] (An-Nisa 4: 85) “Whoever recommends and helps a good cause becomes a partner therein: And whoever recommends and helps an evil cause, shares in its burden”

[3] (Hisar Camii Vaazi, 24/03/1991, Izmir) There is very famous sermon on the internet where he decided to give up for similar reasons. If you want to look at it; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NVVAIjaZEC4

Hizmet Movement and Transparency*

The transparency of the Hizmet or Gülen Movement has long been a theme of various critics – writers, intellectuals and politicians. In the context of Turkey where secularism is deployed as a means to control religion rather than to separate it from politics, it is not hard to understand why this theme has been so popular. Since Ataturk placed severest legal restrictions on religious institutions and important sites (like graveyards and religious centres), all religious groups were banned. In order to exist all, have been forced to give themselves a make-over. Some, such as the Mevlevis (Rumi), Bektashis and Alavis, were more successful than others about re-organizing themselves as charities and NGOs at securing the approval of the authorities. However, some other groups, which were not successful enough to establish their legitimate existence stayed at shades or fade away by time.

Hizmet emerged in this climate as a religiously inspired post-modern movement that was not formally defined or organized but nevertheless survived without conflict with the existing structures. After all, it was a group of people trying to engage in every aspect of life without compromising their religious commitments. The transparency question was continually raised but the Movement’s volunteers were able to answer for themselves and satisfy the authorities, even when the questioning took the form of an exhaustingly long judicial process.

Hizmet has never faced any form of judicial scrutiny outside of Turkey, be it on the basis of its transparency or otherwise or on any other matter. . This is mainly because the people in the Movement conducts all their activities according to the rules and regulations of the country concerned and is open to any kind of inspection. Nevertheless, anxieties remain about the transparency of the Movement in some circles. There are a number of reasons why these anxieties persist:

1) The difference in mind set. In the Western world, intensely competitive self-interest – required and driven by the way contemporary capitalist markets work – has eroded the values and traditions of service to others, in the family or in society at large. Concepts like altruism and sacrifice for the benefit of others are no longer considered “normal” and therefore viewed with suspicion. If there are people who are very active but not motivated by self-interest, if they are engaged in the “pursuit of happiness” but through altruism rather than hedonism, it is supposed that they must have a “secret” or “hidden” agenda which does fit the “norm” of selfish motivation. In other words, such people, it is supposed, are not being “transparent”. The modern “norm” is a paradigm that does not, perhaps cannot, recognize that serving others is a way, aside from its usefulness to community, to find contentment and peace. For the Hizmet volunteers, the norm is derived from a different paradigm: for them, effort in this life is a means of winning success in the afterlife. They see this world as a place where seeds are planted, whose fruits they will harvest in the world to come. This difference in paradigm is a major obstacle to understanding Hizmet and the commitment of its volunteers.

2) An unstructured movement: Unlike civil society organizations in the Western world, Hizmet is a grassroots movement, not a formally structured, centrally-run organization. In Western societies, a great deal of energy is committed to preparing and planning – this can be a long, complicated process involving the marshalling of all the necessary means and resources before the plan can be executed. As a result of that process, these societies, albeit very efficient when they act, are sometimes slow to move in response to the needs that are there. The approach of the Hizmet volunteers is different. They proceed from a strong belief that God will help and sustain their effort and bring it to fruition in the future. Thus they do not prepare and plan but not begin until all the means and resources are in place. Rather, they have their inspirational sources, their ideas and good will, and they make a start with whatever means they have to hand in whatever situation they find themselves. They say: “Our duty is to strive and it is God who wills and guides the outcomes from our striving.” The absence of a central planning body which tells the volunteers what to do is another reason why the success and dynamism of the Hizmet movement puzzles observers who cannot understand how diverse people working autonomously in diverse locations can achieve outcomes that are coherent and mutually supportive.

3) Being for and not against: The Hizmet volunteers share a new perspective, first clearly formulated in modern times by Said Nursi, namely that it is essential to be positively in favour of doing good, of making a constructive contribution to society, rather than seeking to criticize what is wrong or to fight against others or against the whole “system”. Nursi taught that it is more important to support and take part in constructive activities rather than negative, destructive activities. Those who criticize may well be right in their judgement but it does not follow that they also have the will or the power to establish something good to put in the place of what they are criticizing. Thus every positive contribution is valuable, however small it may seem to the individual making it, and if this attitude is sustained over time, it comes to be shared by others, and the small contributions then add up.

4) Being out of sight: Given the power to publicize things that new communications technologies have made available, it is common for volunteers and their organizations to put out as much publicity as they can, to make bold “mission statements” and announce and promote themselves. In the Hizmet movement, the emphasis is on people fulfilling their responsibilities towards God by actively serving the community. Accordingly, they pay less attention to public relations and more to the particular service they have engaged to provide. This means that the Hizmet volunteers do not seek the limelight for themselves, individually or as a group. They do not have a general “mission” or a general “image”, as so many organizations do and which they actively promote. Rather, the Hizmet volunteers have a particular service that they are trying to provide to the highest standard within their capacities. If they want attention at all, it is for that service, not for themselves. Given the widespread culture of competing for attention or celebrity, the fact that Hizmet volunteers stay out of sight is another factor prompting anxieties about “transparency”.

Those are the four main reasons why critics of the Hizmet movement are (or claim to be) so concerned about its transparency. And yet the solution to their anxiety is simple. The Movement is, and has always been, very open to any kind of dialogue with and questioning by others. Nobody can claim to have a problem of transparency when the Movement is itself keen that others find out about it and, if they want to and only to the extent that they want to, contribute to its culture of service. That, after all, is precisely how Hizmet has grown. 

*This article has also published in: 

http://www.athought.info/2011/08/gulen-movement-and-transparency

http://www.gulenmovement.us/gulen-movement-and-transparency.html

Peace Talks and Gulen's Statement

 Peace is beneficial (khair), Benefit (khair) is with peace (“Sulh hayirdir, hayir sulhtadir...”)

The Turkish government has reinitiated peace talks (or cease fire negotiations) with the terrorist organization[1] PKK, and it has become the number one topic of public discussions in Turkey.  A recent video clip[2] shows Fethullah Gülen joining the conversation and sharing his opinions about the latest peace talks.

Terrorism has been a big problem for Turkey and the PKK has been on the scene for the last 30 years causing nearly 37.000 casualties including PKK militants, Turkish armed forces and civilians[3].  The Turkish state has spent billions of dollars to tackle this issue, however, terrorism remains, in general (and PKK in particular) as one of the biggest problems facing Turkey.

Gülen and Peace Talks

Gülen and his statements regarding the peace initiative have faced a barrage of comments. It appears that the media have received Gulen’s statements as a supporting position for the government initiative concerning the peace talks between them and the PKK[4] which at first sight appears to be the case in general terms. But what exactly is Gülen saying in his message? I will try to explore a few of the details within the statement that I believe it is important to highlight.

Gülen quite simply claims that peace is beneficial and essential for all parties. He suggests any attempt to achieve peace at any level (“whether in families, communities, in cities, at a national and global level”) is good no matter how hard it is. Apart from this intrinsic value of peace (sulh), it seems that it is particularly important for Gülen to achieve a peaceful solution for the matter at hand. Although one would expect Gülen to be in favour of peace as a renowned peace activist[5] , this statement from him supporting the current peace talks is rather an important one which has particular political value for the Government.

The Turkish population is quite divided on this matter because of the sensitivity of the issue. Nationalists claim that to even negotiate with terrorists demonstrates a weakness on the part of the Government. Gülen recognizes and acknowledges this concern and asks for a peace which would undermine “national pride”. There are intellectuals who question his position as they do not understand “how it is going to be possible to achieve peace without compromising national pride?” They  believe that it is impossible. Gülen places careful  emphasis on the matter , accepting their concern but then claiming that parties (of negotiaters) should take some risk for the sake of solution.

I think the most vital point in his statement is the example he provided to support his point.  Gülen gives the example of the Hudaybiyyah[6]  agreement where the Prophet (pbuh) agreed to sign a peace treaty with the Meccans although the conditions were degrading. Gülen reminds us how the Prophet (pbuh) preferred peace over conflict (even when the terms were unacceptable or unfavourable for him) and highlights that this was andremains the way for us to follow. The example suggests that “these peace talks can be concluded with a sustainable peace” in the country. The Hudabiyyah example also implies that the treaty may appear as a loss for the Turkish state right now, but in the mid-term and long term the peace will in fact be a “real victory”.

He implies to his listeners (and the wider audience) that peace might seem costly but it should be achieved for the greater good. According to Gülen, the Prophet (pbuh) agreed to more severe terms in order to achieve peace and was proven right and victorious at the end of the process.

In my opinion, Gülen provides not only moral (religious) support for the peace talks but also prepares people to be ready to compromise for peace to be attained. He reminds us that compromising one’s personal pride can be necessary (and even more virtuous) when it is a matter of achieving peace (sulh).  

With the Hudaibiyah analogy, Gülen gives us a timely reminder that peace is achievable when our approach is right so let us hope a solution can be reached and the problem is not bigger than it may at first appear.

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[1] it has been accepted as a “terrorist organization” by US and EU

[2] http://herkul.org/index.php/herkul-nagme/10149-195-nagme-sulh-hayirdir

[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pkk

[4] http://www.todayszaman.com/news-303402-islamic-scholar-gulen-backs-peace-talks-between-government-and-pkk.html

[5] http://www.dialoguesociety.org/notices/321-fethullah-guelen-awarded-honorary-doctorate-by-leeds-metropolitan-university.html

[6] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Hudaybiyyah