Abundant accusations, little evidence

This article was first published: https://www.turkishminute.com/2016/09/15/opinion-abundant-accusations-little-evidence/

The Turkish media – or what is left of it – has already found Fethullah Gülen guilty of the coup attempt on July 15. When challenged about the evidence, the most common reply is “Come to Turkey and see” or “Everyone in Turkey thinks this way.” This almost unanimous opinion is not a coincidence, and it does imply a monopoly over the Turkish media rather than any objective fact.

Already, the Turkish media has moved on from the coup attempt and nowadays is trying to prove that everything that has gone wrong in Turkey is because of Gülen. TV commentators argue that Gülenists plotted against military officers in the Ergenekon case, but the next day an Ergenekon suspect is arrested for being a Gülenist. One main TV channel even introduced the cheat codes of famous computer game Grand Theft Auto V as secret codes of Gülenist coup planners. However, I will only concentrate on some of the credible (!) arguments.

Military involvement
The argument that Gülen and the Hizmet movement were involved in the coup is shaped around accusations, not evidence. In the first instance, while the coup was still under way Erdoğan accused Gülen of being behind it. Yet, in his own words at that point he had been unable to contact the chief intelligence officer or the chief of general staff. He claimed he had not been briefed before the broadcast he made to the nation, and he didn’t know anything about the coup attempt until his brother-in-law rang him on the evening of July 15. It is hard to pin down when exactly this call happened as Erdoğan gives three different times in three different interviews.

Media channels and TV commentators then started to broadcast this and other accusations, especially in Turkey but also in some foreign media outlets. The most notable accusation comes from Chief of General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar. He claims that one putschist (Hakan Evrim) offered to put him in touch with Gülen by phone. However, Evrim denies this allegation in his own statement and gives an entirely different story. Is there any evidence at all to support Akar’s claim? Does Evrim have Gülen’s contact details in his phone? Did he ring him? What could be the motive for an officer to try to connect Gülen to the coup at a time when it had already been thwarted (at around 8 a.m. the following morning)?

There are more questions about Akar’s statement. First of all, Akar’s statement is contradicted by three other people who were in the room. Secondly, Akar’s own involvement in the coup is not clear. Thirdly, are the putschists trying to cover their tracks by directing it to a more “convenient scapegoat”? It is plausible that Akar, who is known as a staunch Kemalist, is choosing to comply with Erdoğan’s narrative and clear his own name while supporting further purges of Gülenists.

Levent Türkkan’s confession is also important. He was the aide to the chief of general staff and claims he received orders from Gülenists. However, this “confession” was presented to the media with a photograph in which Türkkan shows signs of having been tortured. Rather than supporting the accusations, the photograph of Türkkan tends to destroy their credibility. If he was indeed tortured, it shows how far some people are willing to go to pin the coup on Gülen.

Türkkan’s photo and reports from Amnesty International raise serious concerns about how reliable accusations can be if the Turkish security forces are using torture to get information or confessions. Also, after the post-coup purge of some 3,000 judges and prosecutors, how fair can the judiciary be? Is it possible that some putschists are being persuaded to cut a deal with prosecutors by giving statements in line with Erdoğan’s narrative in exchange for a pardon?

Brig, Gen. Fatih Celaleddin Sağır’s statement raises still more questions. He says, “I had been going to the [Gülen organization’s] houses and dormitories between 1988 and 1992, attending all their gatherings. I had served the Gülen organization for 10 years. After 2007, especially with the Sledgehammer and Ergenekon operations, I started to move away. I suspended my relationship with them.” First of all, can it be true that a general was able to go regularly to Gülen dormitories and remain within the Kemalist military during a period in which anyone with the slightest inclination towards Gülen or any other religious group would be immediately dismissed? Secondly, even if it is true that he was a Gülen sympathizer in the past, he claims to have left the movement 10 years before the time of the attempted coup. Isn’t the question: So who are you working with now?

Police involvement
It ıs reported that three police officers were captured during the coup. Yet the number of police officers reported to have been purged for Gülenist affiliations before the coup was more than 4,000. If only three of them took part in the coup, then it means that the Hizmet movement did not take part; otherwise, their numbers would have been much greater. Even if we take a close look only at the individuals involved, the accusations do not hold. For example, Mithat Ayrancı was dismissed from the police force for being a Gülenist in 2014, but he took the matter to court, which ruled there was no evidence supporting the accusations against him and ordered his reinstatement. The government did not abide by the court’s decision and he was not reinstated. So there is evidence that Ayrancı justifiably resented his treatment by Erdoğan and the ruling party, but no proof at all that he was a Gülenist.

Questionable link
The most important question mark about the coup attempt concerns a theology professor, Adil Öksüz. He was arrested in a village called Kazancı near the Akıncı air base. The claim is that he is the link between the army and Gülen. However, he said that he was there “to buy land” in the village. He was held in custody for two days and released after his initial statement. Now there is a warrant for his arrest.

At a time when possession of a single book by Gülen or a debit card from BankAsya or even buying credit for your phone from a shop owner known to be a Gülen sympathizer Is enough reason for arrest, it is strange that an individual held to be key to the coup plot can be released and allowed to disappear. It’s even stranger that the judges who ordered his release are not among those purged while so many others have been arrested for having a bank account at BankAsya or subscribing to the Zaman daily.

Missing facts
While accusations are flying about individuals, a great deal of hard evidence is lacking on the actual organization of the coup attempt. Where are the operation plans? Where are the camera records of military HQ and the Akıncı base? What about the phone communications between the putschist generals? What about the GPS traces of all the accused parties such as Adil Öksüz and Akin Öztürk?

It is a stretch to conclude that the coup attempt had anything to do with Gülen or his supporters; if it were, we would have seen many more Gülenists taking part in events.

Very few of the putschists stated any affiliation with Gülen and in fact most confessed to having other secular or Kemalist affiliations. All the important questions still remain unanswered, but the pro-government media goes on rubbing the same few confessions in our face.

*Doctor of philosophy, Director of Centre for Hizmet Studies

My interview with Zeinab Badawi for BBC HARDtalk

Zeinab Badawi speaks to Ismail Sezgin, director of the Centre for Hizmet Studies in the UK, an educational think tank founded by supporters of Fethullah Gulen. The Turkish government is continuing to hunt down people who it claims are followers of the reclusive US-based Turkish cleric. The government blames Gulen for the recent coup attempt and wants the US to extradite him to Turkey to stand trial. He denies involvement. Is the Gulenist movement a threat to the Turkish state?

Are there any Gulen supporters in judiciary?

I was asked whether there are Gulen supporters in Judiciary?

Newshour BBC world service

GÜLEN AND POLITICS 1

GÜLEN AND POLITICS 1

In recent months, the well known scholar and preacher Fethullah Gülen has become a target for criticism from certain Turkish political figures. In this article, I will attempt to explain Gülen’s  position as regards political issues and how he has become a political instrument for the current government.

Historically, people with Islamic concerns have chosen different ways to survive (or struggle) with the secularist reforms of Kemalist Turkey. The early reforms laid down legislation that outlawed all Sufi orders and their activities (tariqas), and abolished most other religious organizations and committees, as well as denying access to or dismantling religious sites such as graveyards of the saints and Companions.

Under this strict ban, one set of religious groups either continued their activities in secret (the Qadiris, Naqshbandis and Mawlawis); a second set abolished their services (this included most of the Zaviyas and some other social centres such as food houses or asevleri).

Other scholars chose to take part in politics or the bureaucracy and to serve society as civil servants, mostly as heads of the newly established Diyanet institution (Religious Affairs).

A fourth set of scholars decided to stay away from the political sphere and bureaucracy and worked within society. Said Nursi, for instance, deliberately kept himself at a distance from politics and concentrated on writing and educating within the fields of Islamic theology and philosophy. Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan concentrated his efforts on teaching the Qur’an to the next generation. Both scholars managed to establish slow and steady community support for their causes and this transformed their communities into movements which later contributed to the development of Turkish society.

 Gülen and Politics

Fethullah Gülen  belongs to the same tradition as Nursi and Tunahan. Gülen  encouraged his listeners to undertake responsibility for three major needs within society, namely, the need for education, the need for dialogue and the need to give in charity. His choice to remain detached from active political life does not, however, mean that Gülen has ever been apolitical or anti-political. He has, in fact, always valued the right to vote as a citizen and encouraged people to take responsibility in elections by fulfilling their duty as citizens. He has also encouraged his listeners to use their rights as citizens and to take part in all sectors of life and society, be it public or private. One could therefore safely say that he is an individual who supports the political process as a duty of citizenship. What he has avoided himself and counselled those engaged in civil society projects to avoid is partisan politics.

Democracy 

Gülen’s position can be summarized as open support for democracy, as well as advocating a liberal secularism where people are free to exercise their religious or non-religious activities. He has consistently maintained an “equal distance from all political parties”, ensuring he was in conversation with all in an effort to serve society by always striving to gather support for the Hizmet movement’s education projects both in Turkey and abroad.

In 1995, when Gülen stated that “democracy is an inherent value of our culture”, political Islamists challenged and criticized him. For instance, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as a young politician and a representative of political Islamism, explained at that time how he saw democracies (and elections) as mere vehicles to assume power. In contrast to Gülen’s view of democracy as a modern reflection of a value with deep cultural roots, Erdoğan stated publicly that one should know where to get off the democracy train after reaching the desired “destination”.

The only time that Gülen has made a specific political appeal was when he called on his listeners to vote for greater freedoms in the referendum on reforming some articles in the constitution. The current constitution still reflects the fact that it was prepared by a military regime in 1982, and there have been many amendments during the long and slow process of the democratization of Turkey. Moreover, as it provides guidance for the further democratization of the country, Gülen is also in favour of Turkey’s European Union membership process.

Secularism

Gülen is in favour of secularism if it is defined as the religious freedom of the individual rather than state-controlled religion, the latter being the case in Turkey at present. He is confident that Islam can flourish comfortably in a free environment where no religion is favoured or oppressed. This form of secularism can be observed in the educational practice of Hizmet schools in Turkey and abroad.

Politics

To reiterate, Gülen is not against politics, nor a political system; however, he consciously refrains from involving himself in active politics where one seeks public support by elections to influence political life. Instead, Gülen prefers to concentrate on social projects within civil society and encourages voluntary public support for projects around education, dialogue and charity.

Political influence

Not being party-political is one thing, having political influence is another. As a public intellectual, Islamic scholar and philanthropist Gülen certainly has credibility and spiritual influence among the masses, giving him some incidental political influence. Gülen’s call for Muslims to take part in every sphere of life and his encouragement of the development of educational activities not only resulted in the establishment of the Hizmet Movement, but has also influenced and changed other religious movements and their modes of working. A prominent example of this is in Erdoğan’s apparent shifting of his political stance from Necmeddin Erbakan’s political Islamism (the views typical of the  Milli Görüs movement) towards that of a Muslim-democrat in 2002, the latter stance being more in line with Gülen than Erbakan.

Gülen’s followers are undeniably amongst the most educated religious community in Turkey. The majority of Gülen’s followers are university graduates with a very high number of them also holding post-graduate qualifications, and there are many of them who are professionals in various sectors, such as business, media, health, education, engineering and academia. The current Prime Minister, Erdoğan, is well aware of Gülen’s influence, and has, through the media, called upon Gülen to motivate his followers to support the government on several issues, including the Kurdish peace talks and the latest referendum.

Some degree of political influence can be rightly attributed to Gülen; however, with the March 29 local elections, it became evident that although the movement is still strong enough to survive and motivate participants, its political influence is limited.

Erdoğan now seems to have realised that the Hizmet movement, as a loose network of people with limited political influence, and Gülen, as a ‘silent opponent’, can be very useful as a political tool he can exploit to avoid corruption allegations and implement his own agenda in the “New Turkey”. He has increased the stridency of his tone and his efforts in such a way that they seem to target the Hizmet movement but his actual aim is clearly to redefine the future of Turkish democracy on his own terms. In this process, he is dividing conservative Muslim society in Turkey into two camps that he sees as “for us” and “against us”.

In my next article, I shall look further at how Gülen and Hizmet became a political tool for Erdoğan to frighten the voters and make it possible to legislate some of the most authoritarian laws in Turkey in recent months and the dangers of these events.

A power struggle? I think not! A personal response to a Guardian article

Photograph: Jivan Guner/EPA

Photograph: Jivan Guner/EPA

Thoughts shared with the editor of The Guardian about a recent article covering the current political climate in Turkey.

Dear Editor,

I am emailing about the following article: Turkish police caught in middle of war between Erdoğan and former ally Gülen by Constanze Letsch on Sunday 9 February 2014. (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/09/turkish-police-fethullah-Gülen-network)

  

I am sorry to say that I found the article lacking in a number of important respects. I am emailing to provide feedback which I hope will be taken in the light that it is offered: honest, non-reactionary and genuine. I am a PhD researcher on Fethullah Gülen’s philosophy and recently submitted my thesis on Gülen’s moral responsibility theory.

For ease of reference I am detailing my critique in list form:-

  1.      The entire article is based on the argument that the Gülen-inspired Hizmet movement has infiltrated the police. The author is welcome to take this position if he or she so wishes of course. But given that this is a central argument/proposition of the article, should not the author dedicate at least a paragraph or two as to why he believes this narrative over the alternative - that is that there are Gülen sympathisers in the police force, that this is a statistical inevitability given that the movement is widespread and focuses on education but that there is no parallel decision making-process and that such officers cannot be suspect simply because they are Gülen inspired. What is important is whether or not they comply with the law, constitution and their own professional code of conduct.

2.      The entire article claims that the Hizmet movement has infiltrated the police and judiciary and are running these corruption investigations. These are serious allegations against a civil society movement comprising many people. Therefore, should not the author include what Gülen and the movement have to say about this? The article does not. This is not only deeply unfair to Gülen, the movement and officers inspired by Gülen but also to its readers who will not be informed of the movement’s rebuttal.

3.      The entire article claims that the Hizmet movement has infiltrated the police force and judiciary but does not include a single reference to the fact that Gülen was tried of this charge between 2000 and 2006. The charge against him was to head an organisation to infiltrate state structures - including the police. After the 6 year trial, Gülen was acquitted (not dismissed or dropped) of all charges in 2006. The prosecutor appealed and Gülen’s acquittal was upheld by the highest court of appeal in the land in 2008. What is more, this trial was conducted by a staunchly secular judiciary – a judiciary that convicted the AK Party in 2008 of being the centre of religious reactionarysm.

Given the central argument of the piece and the obvious relevance of the trial, why did the author not mention it in his article? If Gülen had been found guilty in 2006 of ‘infiltrating the state’, surely the author would have included that given that he’s included a Wikileak quote to the same effect. Is this not grossly unfair? It gives the strong impression that the author only includes what fits his narrative.

4.      The article does not state that so far 7,000 police officers and 300 prosecutors have been reassigned. It does not inform its readers that those reassigned (purged) did not face a single charge or disciplinary procedure before or after being reassigned. Surely that is important. If these people are guilty, then why reassign them to another province? Surely the thing to do is to ensure that they are removed from their post according to due process.

5.      The article does not state that those purged does not only include police officers and prosecutors running live corruption investigations but also police officers in any part of Turkey that could run investigations into government corruption (i.e. those attached to the organised crime unit). Clearly this is not about Gülen or Gülen inspired officers but about preventing any investigation into government corruption.

6.      The article draws a comparison between the ‘corruption investigations’ and ‘government purge’ of ‘Gülenists’ by quoting Ahmet Sik who says ‘There is also a real witchhunt going on. We have massive corruption on the one hand, but the investigation against it also violates democratic and judicial principles. It's a choice between a rock and a hard place, pest and cholera.’ The point being made is that the ‘corruption investigations’ and the ‘counter purges’ are both illegitimate. But the article does not say how? The corruption investigations were run by state prosecutors according to the law and overseen by court orders. How can that be compared to the mass scale government purge that has not sought to follow any judicial process or procedure whatsoever.

7.      The article states the dramatic and far-reaching ‘purges have been taking place more quietly for years. According to both Yilmaz and Gün, internal investigations have been conducted against tens of thousands of police officers over the past four years alone.’ The article does not address the anomaly here: if tens of thousands of Gülen-inspired officers have been purged from the police force for over the past four years (and before the current wave of reassignments), how can the Hizmet movement continue to wield such great power within the police force today to the degree that they can mount such massive government corruption investigations?

8.      The article is selective in that it refers to only part of Erdogan’s ‘this is a Gülenist coup’ claim. The article states that Erdogan believes that ‘Gülenists’ are behind the corruption investigations. But why does it omit the fact that Erdogan from the very beginning has claimed that this ‘Gülenist parallel state’ acts on behalf of an international coalition of powers. His advisers and MPs have named these powers explicitly as the US, Israel, Germany, UK, France etc.

9.      Curiously, the article does not state that the opposition political parties such as the left-wing Republican Peoples Party of the right wing National Action Party does not buy into Erdogan’s argument that the Hizmet movement is orchestrating these probes through its people in the police force. Why not? The author does not include a single rebuttal in the entire article that counters the claim that ‘Gülenists’ have infiltrated the police and are behind all this. Is that not odd?

10.   The articles does not query how these officers were identified as ‘Gülenist’ in the absence of any formal process. If we are to accept that these officers were purged for being ‘Gülenist’ then we must concede that they were profiled prior to these investigations. The author does not follow or even hint at this line of enquiry. 

11.   The article states that ‘[t]hose who dared to criticise the Gülen movement before were swiftly punished’ but does not state that to date over 44 anti-Gülen books have been published - over 25 between 2006 and 2011. If this argument was fair these authors would also have faced a similar treatment to that of Ahmet Sik. Why does the author not refer to this point at all? (Reference: Koç, D. (2011) Strategic Defamation Of Fethullah Gülen: English Vs. Turkish. European Journal of Economic and Political Studies, 4, pp.189–244.)

Most importantly, the article does not address the elephant in the room: that is that to prevent the corruption investigations the government is causing a Constitutional crisis to undermine the separation of powers in Turkey. This is the big story here and is completely missed. The author is welcome to dismiss it – but should he not have at least alerted his readers to this narrative.

My problem with the article is not that it takes a particular view. After all, it is an opinion piece and will do so. My concern is that the article makes very serious and grave allegations about a popular movement but does not state what they have to say about these claims. It takes one narrative without explaining why it has dismissed the alternative. It omits vital information that is highly relevant. Overall, this not only undermines the article but is also unfair to the author’s readers.

Yours kindly

Ismail Mesut Sezgin