What happenned to Zaman and Samanyolu TV (A short list of events)

12/23/2013       Turkey's flagship carrier Turkish Airlines (THY) stopped the distribution of the Zaman, Today's Zaman, Bugün and Ortadoğu dailies to business-class passengers on its planes on Monday without any explanation, though other dailies are still being handed out onboard.

1/6/2014           CHP Deputy Chairman Sezgin Tanrıkulu submitted a question in Parliament on Monday asking Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan why the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) has canceled its subscriptions to the Zaman and Bugün dailies.

2/7/2014           The deportation of Today's Zaman journalist Mahir Zeynalov for Twitter messages that were critical of the government is a setback for press freedom, say international press organizations

3/2/2014              The Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) has issued a warning over news program “Derin Bakış” (Deep View), which is broadcast on Samanyolu News TV, on the grounds that the program is “biased,” only a week after it penalized Bugün TV for the same reason.

3/25/2014            The Supreme Election Board (YSK) has issued a three-week broadcasting suspension for Bugün TV's news program “Özgür İfade” (Free Expression) and a four-week broadcasting suspension for another program on the same TV channel, “Gündem Özel” (Special Agenda), on the grounds that both have violated the equality of opportunity among political parties.

3/27/2014            The Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) has suspended 15 more programs of the Samanyolu Haber TV news channel, in addition to the suspension of 20 programs in mid-March, Samanyolu Broadcasting Group General Manager Hidayet Karaca said on Wednesday.

4/4/2014              On Thursday night Samanyolu Haber TV news channel was the latest to face a cyber attack, as readers have at times also recently been unable to access the websites of the dailies Zaman, Today's Zaman and Taraf, as well as the Cihan news agency, particularly since the night of the local elections on March 30.

5/28/2014            In Mardin, Hizmet movement's two radio channels were banned because they are allegedly a "threat to national security" 

6/4/2014              The Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTÜK) has been harassing TV networks that it deems to be anti-government, and Samanyolu TV has become one of its major targets.

6/5/2014              A prosecutor has filed charges against a director of Samanyolu TV accusing him of “insulting” and “slandering” Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and fomenting “grudges and hostility among the public,” demanding up to 11 years and two months in prison.

6/7/2014              Prime Minister Erdogan claimed that if "the December 17th plot" were successful, those who are not subscribed to Zaman daily will be purged from their posts by Hizmet operations

6/12/2014            Construction of Samanyolu Media Center building in Istanbul was halted without any reason

7/1/2014              The ruling AKP imposed a media accreditation ban on a number of outlets, including Taraf, Sözcü, Yurt, Birgün, Evrensel, Yeni Asya and Aydınlık dailies, as well as broadcasters Halk TV, Ulusal Kanal and Hayat TV, preventing them from covering a ceremony to announce Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's candidacy for the presidency on Tuesday.

7/10/2014            Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan urged people to boycott the Zaman media group while speaking in a rally in the Black Sea city of Tokat on Wednesday.

7/11/2014            The government reportedly held a secret meeting at the Finance Ministry in June to damage the credibility of 100,000 companies considered to be linked to the Hizmet movement, which were already being profiled by the government and refusing to obey the government's ill-motivated instructions, the Taraf daily claimed.

7/11/2014            Minutes before Friday's iftar, the breaking of the Ramadan fast, The municipal police of the AKP Üsküdar municipality forced a Samanyolu TV (STV) crew out of the mosque's garden, where they were shooting a Ramadan program, despite the crew having gained official permission from the authorities.

7/14/2014            A member of the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) has submitted a written parliamentary question demanding to know if 100,000 companies have been profiled by the National Police Department on the grounds that they are close to the Hizmet movement.

7/16/2014            Main opposition CHP Deputy Chairman Sezgin Tanrıkulu spoke in Parliament on Wednesday about the cancellation of the award ceremony of a short film contest after the competition was won by Seleme Gülen, a relative of Turkish Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen.

7/21/2014            The Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) fined Samanyolu TV on Sunday for running a news story about a student named Fethullah Gülen who prepared for the Transition to Higher Education Examination (YGS) with the Hizmet-affiliated Körfez University Preparation School in İzmir.

7/31/2014            Deputy Chairman of the AKP Suleyman Soylu woved to "exterminate" Hizmet movement activists

8/10/2014            A 35-year-old man has been killed in Yalova province by a drug addict on the grounds that the victim was a follower of the faith-based Hizmet movement, against which the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has declared battle since last year, and because he was a critic of Erdoğan.

8/19/2014            Independent and critical media outlets in Turkey -- including Zaman, the country's highest-circulation newspaper, and Cihan, the country's largest private news agency -- were denied accreditation to cover the ruling AKP extraordinary congress slated for Aug. 27.

8/22/2014            The Ministry of Education has blocked access to samanyoluhaber.com, a news website affiliated with the Hizmet movement, at institutions and organizations that are linked to the ministry.

9/18/2014            Reporters from the Zaman daily and the Cihan news agency were excluded from European Union Affairs Minister and chief EU negotiator Volkan Bozkır's press meeting in Brussels on Thursday

9/26/2014            Erdoğan’s men attack 2 journalists from Zaman, Bugün in US

9/26/2014            The Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) has fined the STV and Samanyolu Haber television stations 1 percent of their advertising revenues over their reports on a police officer who lost his wife and the couple's unborn baby after being arrested as part of a government-backed operation against members of the police force.

11/18/2014         Correspondents from the Zaman and Bugun newspapers, the Samanyolu TV station and Cihan news agency say they have been banned from the presidential palace since Erdogan’s inauguration in August and no longer receive official press releases

I have compiled media related facts from a wider report. Please read the full report from http://www.rethinkinstitute.org/persecution-hizmet-gulen-movement-turkey-chronicle/

GÜLEN AND POLITICS 1

GÜLEN AND POLITICS 1

In recent months, the well known scholar and preacher Fethullah Gülen has become a target for criticism from certain Turkish political figures. In this article, I will attempt to explain Gülen’s  position as regards political issues and how he has become a political instrument for the current government.

Historically, people with Islamic concerns have chosen different ways to survive (or struggle) with the secularist reforms of Kemalist Turkey. The early reforms laid down legislation that outlawed all Sufi orders and their activities (tariqas), and abolished most other religious organizations and committees, as well as denying access to or dismantling religious sites such as graveyards of the saints and Companions.

Under this strict ban, one set of religious groups either continued their activities in secret (the Qadiris, Naqshbandis and Mawlawis); a second set abolished their services (this included most of the Zaviyas and some other social centres such as food houses or asevleri).

Other scholars chose to take part in politics or the bureaucracy and to serve society as civil servants, mostly as heads of the newly established Diyanet institution (Religious Affairs).

A fourth set of scholars decided to stay away from the political sphere and bureaucracy and worked within society. Said Nursi, for instance, deliberately kept himself at a distance from politics and concentrated on writing and educating within the fields of Islamic theology and philosophy. Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan concentrated his efforts on teaching the Qur’an to the next generation. Both scholars managed to establish slow and steady community support for their causes and this transformed their communities into movements which later contributed to the development of Turkish society.

 Gülen and Politics

Fethullah Gülen  belongs to the same tradition as Nursi and Tunahan. Gülen  encouraged his listeners to undertake responsibility for three major needs within society, namely, the need for education, the need for dialogue and the need to give in charity. His choice to remain detached from active political life does not, however, mean that Gülen has ever been apolitical or anti-political. He has, in fact, always valued the right to vote as a citizen and encouraged people to take responsibility in elections by fulfilling their duty as citizens. He has also encouraged his listeners to use their rights as citizens and to take part in all sectors of life and society, be it public or private. One could therefore safely say that he is an individual who supports the political process as a duty of citizenship. What he has avoided himself and counselled those engaged in civil society projects to avoid is partisan politics.

Democracy 

Gülen’s position can be summarized as open support for democracy, as well as advocating a liberal secularism where people are free to exercise their religious or non-religious activities. He has consistently maintained an “equal distance from all political parties”, ensuring he was in conversation with all in an effort to serve society by always striving to gather support for the Hizmet movement’s education projects both in Turkey and abroad.

In 1995, when Gülen stated that “democracy is an inherent value of our culture”, political Islamists challenged and criticized him. For instance, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as a young politician and a representative of political Islamism, explained at that time how he saw democracies (and elections) as mere vehicles to assume power. In contrast to Gülen’s view of democracy as a modern reflection of a value with deep cultural roots, Erdoğan stated publicly that one should know where to get off the democracy train after reaching the desired “destination”.

The only time that Gülen has made a specific political appeal was when he called on his listeners to vote for greater freedoms in the referendum on reforming some articles in the constitution. The current constitution still reflects the fact that it was prepared by a military regime in 1982, and there have been many amendments during the long and slow process of the democratization of Turkey. Moreover, as it provides guidance for the further democratization of the country, Gülen is also in favour of Turkey’s European Union membership process.

Secularism

Gülen is in favour of secularism if it is defined as the religious freedom of the individual rather than state-controlled religion, the latter being the case in Turkey at present. He is confident that Islam can flourish comfortably in a free environment where no religion is favoured or oppressed. This form of secularism can be observed in the educational practice of Hizmet schools in Turkey and abroad.

Politics

To reiterate, Gülen is not against politics, nor a political system; however, he consciously refrains from involving himself in active politics where one seeks public support by elections to influence political life. Instead, Gülen prefers to concentrate on social projects within civil society and encourages voluntary public support for projects around education, dialogue and charity.

Political influence

Not being party-political is one thing, having political influence is another. As a public intellectual, Islamic scholar and philanthropist Gülen certainly has credibility and spiritual influence among the masses, giving him some incidental political influence. Gülen’s call for Muslims to take part in every sphere of life and his encouragement of the development of educational activities not only resulted in the establishment of the Hizmet Movement, but has also influenced and changed other religious movements and their modes of working. A prominent example of this is in Erdoğan’s apparent shifting of his political stance from Necmeddin Erbakan’s political Islamism (the views typical of the  Milli Görüs movement) towards that of a Muslim-democrat in 2002, the latter stance being more in line with Gülen than Erbakan.

Gülen’s followers are undeniably amongst the most educated religious community in Turkey. The majority of Gülen’s followers are university graduates with a very high number of them also holding post-graduate qualifications, and there are many of them who are professionals in various sectors, such as business, media, health, education, engineering and academia. The current Prime Minister, Erdoğan, is well aware of Gülen’s influence, and has, through the media, called upon Gülen to motivate his followers to support the government on several issues, including the Kurdish peace talks and the latest referendum.

Some degree of political influence can be rightly attributed to Gülen; however, with the March 29 local elections, it became evident that although the movement is still strong enough to survive and motivate participants, its political influence is limited.

Erdoğan now seems to have realised that the Hizmet movement, as a loose network of people with limited political influence, and Gülen, as a ‘silent opponent’, can be very useful as a political tool he can exploit to avoid corruption allegations and implement his own agenda in the “New Turkey”. He has increased the stridency of his tone and his efforts in such a way that they seem to target the Hizmet movement but his actual aim is clearly to redefine the future of Turkish democracy on his own terms. In this process, he is dividing conservative Muslim society in Turkey into two camps that he sees as “for us” and “against us”.

In my next article, I shall look further at how Gülen and Hizmet became a political tool for Erdoğan to frighten the voters and make it possible to legislate some of the most authoritarian laws in Turkey in recent months and the dangers of these events.

A power struggle? I think not! A personal response to a Guardian article

Photograph: Jivan Guner/EPA

Photograph: Jivan Guner/EPA

Thoughts shared with the editor of The Guardian about a recent article covering the current political climate in Turkey.

Dear Editor,

I am emailing about the following article: Turkish police caught in middle of war between Erdoğan and former ally Gülen by Constanze Letsch on Sunday 9 February 2014. (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/09/turkish-police-fethullah-Gülen-network)

  

I am sorry to say that I found the article lacking in a number of important respects. I am emailing to provide feedback which I hope will be taken in the light that it is offered: honest, non-reactionary and genuine. I am a PhD researcher on Fethullah Gülen’s philosophy and recently submitted my thesis on Gülen’s moral responsibility theory.

For ease of reference I am detailing my critique in list form:-

  1.      The entire article is based on the argument that the Gülen-inspired Hizmet movement has infiltrated the police. The author is welcome to take this position if he or she so wishes of course. But given that this is a central argument/proposition of the article, should not the author dedicate at least a paragraph or two as to why he believes this narrative over the alternative - that is that there are Gülen sympathisers in the police force, that this is a statistical inevitability given that the movement is widespread and focuses on education but that there is no parallel decision making-process and that such officers cannot be suspect simply because they are Gülen inspired. What is important is whether or not they comply with the law, constitution and their own professional code of conduct.

2.      The entire article claims that the Hizmet movement has infiltrated the police and judiciary and are running these corruption investigations. These are serious allegations against a civil society movement comprising many people. Therefore, should not the author include what Gülen and the movement have to say about this? The article does not. This is not only deeply unfair to Gülen, the movement and officers inspired by Gülen but also to its readers who will not be informed of the movement’s rebuttal.

3.      The entire article claims that the Hizmet movement has infiltrated the police force and judiciary but does not include a single reference to the fact that Gülen was tried of this charge between 2000 and 2006. The charge against him was to head an organisation to infiltrate state structures - including the police. After the 6 year trial, Gülen was acquitted (not dismissed or dropped) of all charges in 2006. The prosecutor appealed and Gülen’s acquittal was upheld by the highest court of appeal in the land in 2008. What is more, this trial was conducted by a staunchly secular judiciary – a judiciary that convicted the AK Party in 2008 of being the centre of religious reactionarysm.

Given the central argument of the piece and the obvious relevance of the trial, why did the author not mention it in his article? If Gülen had been found guilty in 2006 of ‘infiltrating the state’, surely the author would have included that given that he’s included a Wikileak quote to the same effect. Is this not grossly unfair? It gives the strong impression that the author only includes what fits his narrative.

4.      The article does not state that so far 7,000 police officers and 300 prosecutors have been reassigned. It does not inform its readers that those reassigned (purged) did not face a single charge or disciplinary procedure before or after being reassigned. Surely that is important. If these people are guilty, then why reassign them to another province? Surely the thing to do is to ensure that they are removed from their post according to due process.

5.      The article does not state that those purged does not only include police officers and prosecutors running live corruption investigations but also police officers in any part of Turkey that could run investigations into government corruption (i.e. those attached to the organised crime unit). Clearly this is not about Gülen or Gülen inspired officers but about preventing any investigation into government corruption.

6.      The article draws a comparison between the ‘corruption investigations’ and ‘government purge’ of ‘Gülenists’ by quoting Ahmet Sik who says ‘There is also a real witchhunt going on. We have massive corruption on the one hand, but the investigation against it also violates democratic and judicial principles. It's a choice between a rock and a hard place, pest and cholera.’ The point being made is that the ‘corruption investigations’ and the ‘counter purges’ are both illegitimate. But the article does not say how? The corruption investigations were run by state prosecutors according to the law and overseen by court orders. How can that be compared to the mass scale government purge that has not sought to follow any judicial process or procedure whatsoever.

7.      The article states the dramatic and far-reaching ‘purges have been taking place more quietly for years. According to both Yilmaz and Gün, internal investigations have been conducted against tens of thousands of police officers over the past four years alone.’ The article does not address the anomaly here: if tens of thousands of Gülen-inspired officers have been purged from the police force for over the past four years (and before the current wave of reassignments), how can the Hizmet movement continue to wield such great power within the police force today to the degree that they can mount such massive government corruption investigations?

8.      The article is selective in that it refers to only part of Erdogan’s ‘this is a Gülenist coup’ claim. The article states that Erdogan believes that ‘Gülenists’ are behind the corruption investigations. But why does it omit the fact that Erdogan from the very beginning has claimed that this ‘Gülenist parallel state’ acts on behalf of an international coalition of powers. His advisers and MPs have named these powers explicitly as the US, Israel, Germany, UK, France etc.

9.      Curiously, the article does not state that the opposition political parties such as the left-wing Republican Peoples Party of the right wing National Action Party does not buy into Erdogan’s argument that the Hizmet movement is orchestrating these probes through its people in the police force. Why not? The author does not include a single rebuttal in the entire article that counters the claim that ‘Gülenists’ have infiltrated the police and are behind all this. Is that not odd?

10.   The articles does not query how these officers were identified as ‘Gülenist’ in the absence of any formal process. If we are to accept that these officers were purged for being ‘Gülenist’ then we must concede that they were profiled prior to these investigations. The author does not follow or even hint at this line of enquiry. 

11.   The article states that ‘[t]hose who dared to criticise the Gülen movement before were swiftly punished’ but does not state that to date over 44 anti-Gülen books have been published - over 25 between 2006 and 2011. If this argument was fair these authors would also have faced a similar treatment to that of Ahmet Sik. Why does the author not refer to this point at all? (Reference: Koç, D. (2011) Strategic Defamation Of Fethullah Gülen: English Vs. Turkish. European Journal of Economic and Political Studies, 4, pp.189–244.)

Most importantly, the article does not address the elephant in the room: that is that to prevent the corruption investigations the government is causing a Constitutional crisis to undermine the separation of powers in Turkey. This is the big story here and is completely missed. The author is welcome to dismiss it – but should he not have at least alerted his readers to this narrative.

My problem with the article is not that it takes a particular view. After all, it is an opinion piece and will do so. My concern is that the article makes very serious and grave allegations about a popular movement but does not state what they have to say about these claims. It takes one narrative without explaining why it has dismissed the alternative. It omits vital information that is highly relevant. Overall, this not only undermines the article but is also unfair to the author’s readers.

Yours kindly

Ismail Mesut Sezgin

New Multicultural Identities in Europe

New Multicultural Identities in Europe

Religion and Ethnicity in Secular Societies

Multiculturalism in present-day Europe

How to understand Europe’s post-migrant Islam on the one hand and indigenous, anti-Islamic movements on the other? What impact will religion have on the European secular world and its regulation? How do social and economic transitions on a transnational scale challenge ethnic and religious identifications?

These questions are at the very heart of the debate on multiculturalism in present-day Europe and are addressed by the authors in this book. Through the lens of post-migrant societies, manifestations of identity appear in pluralized, fragmented, and deterritorialized forms. This new European multiculturalism calls into question the nature of boundaries between various ethnic-religious groups, as well as the demarcation lines within ethnic-religious communities. Although the contributions in this volume focus on Islam, ample attention is also paid to Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism.

ERKAN TOĞUŞLU is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at KU Leuven Univer­sity, Gülen Chair for Intercultural Studies.

JOHAN LEMAN is Emeritus Professor of Social and Cultural Anthropology at KU Leuven and Chairholder of the Gülen Chair for Intercultural Studies.

İSMAIL MESUT SEZGIN is PhD researcher of the Institute for Spirituality, Religion and Public Life at Leeds Metropolitan University.

Mavi Marmara and Gülen's critics: politics and principles

Illustration: Cem Kızıltuğ

Those who consider the current corruption investigations as a shadow war between Turkish Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan trace the breaking away of Gülen's support for Erdoğan specifically to the Gaza flotilla incident.

I don't believe there was ever an alliance between Gülen and Erdoğan of the type imagined by some commentators, far less that this incident was the cause of the split/separation of that alliance.
Gülen, who may be considered to have derived his interpretive framework from civil/cultural Islam, supported the Justice and Development Party's (AK Party) democratization efforts and benefited from the resultant freedoms that this process brought about. The flotilla incident can, however, be useful in demonstrating the difference of Gülen's mindset from political Islam.

What happened?

On May 27, 2010, a flotilla commissioned by the Humanitarian Aid Foundation (İHH) sailed towards Gaza. Its organizers said they sought to raise awareness of the unjust blockade imposed by the Israeli government by breaking the blockade and delivering humanitarian aid to those in need. The flotilla was raided in international waters by Israeli commandos, killing eight Turkish civilians and one Turkish-American. Turkey responded angrily, and a sequence of reactions followed, including Turkey's foreign minister claiming that this was “Turkey's 9/11,” and the Turkish government recalling its ambassador from Israel and declaring the Israeli ambassador persona non grata.
The atmosphere was very tense, and Turkey threatened to send another flotilla -- this time escorted by Turkish warships. Turkey seemed to be heading towards an all-out war with Israel.
Gülen commented on this incident when a journalist from the Wall Street Journal visited to take photographs for a pre-arranged interview already conducted through email. These comments caused a considerable reaction against Gülen at the time they were made and have resurfaced once again.

What did Gülen say on the flotilla incident?

Gülen's comments concerning the flotilla incident were not necessarily harsh, but they were labeled as surprising and even shocking by some.
Gülen's first comment about the Mavi Marmara incident  -- in which eight Turkish civilians and one Turkish-American were killed by Israeli troops as the boat carried humanitarian aid to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip -- was quite straightforward. He said: “What I saw was not pretty. It was ugly." Most people, I am sure, would agree that it was in fact ugly. There isn't much to elaborate on regarding this comment.
The more direct criticism that Gülen made was concerning the organizers (İHH). He said the organizers' failure to seek an accord with Israel before attempting to deliver aid "is a sign of defying authority, and will not lead to fruitful matters."
This statement has been criticized harshly in the Turkish media. Many columnists and journalists took this as Gülen's criticism of the İHH for not ensuring the relevant permission was obtained from the authorities (which in this case was the Israeli state). Thus they concluded that Gülen believed the incident was ugly and that the İHH was responsible for the devastating outcome as they had not sought permission from Israel. I believe this is a false assumption and an inaccurate conclusion about Gülen's statements. Let us revisit the incident.
Gülen chooses to believe this campaign was established to take aid supplies to needy people in Gaza. He dismisses the political side of the issue, which is apparently much more important than an aid campaign. The Mavi Marmara was designed to raise awareness of the plight of the Palestinians and put pressure on Israeli authorities to lift the blockade on the Gaza Strip. The organizers managed to motivate a significant number of international activists and thereby involve as many states as possible, just in case any problem arose.
Personally, I think the political aims were of greater importance than the charitable goals in this campaign. However, Gülen neither takes this stance nor does he make mention of this; he simply suggests that “if you want to take aid supplies to a country, you should seek accordance with the authorities in that country.”
Following on Gülen's third comment, we see that he places a distance between himself and the organizers and claims that they might have been politicized.
This is an important point. It is widely accepted that any charity that wants to operate around the world should be careful about their involvement in the domestic politics of any country. This often becomes a red line for charities, and they should not involve themselves with politics and political purposes. For instance, the Charity Commission in the United Kingdom has very clear guidelines for charities to follow. It clearly defines political purpose and political activity as being beyond the scope of charities and charitable organizations (Charity Commission, 2008).
Similarly, Gülen, in this case, preferred to be distant from a campaign and its organizers in which he believed the organizers may have been politicized. I don't believe our emotional reactions should shadow this reality. The İHH chose to divert some of its energy to contribute towards a political solution for the Gaza Strip. Although this can be perceived as a noble choice, one should accept that it changes the nature of the campaign from charity to politics, or at the very least, blurs the aim. I believe in such a case; Gülen has a right to distance himself from this choice.
Gülen added that assigning blame in the matter is best left to the United Nations, which shows his respect for international bodies.

The influence of these comments

Gülen's comments have been interpreted as “siding with Israel” and against the flotilla. Many people, including some Hizmet movement members, thought that Gülen was either misinformed (or less informed) about the topic and that he should make a further statement or retract his comments. However, Gülen insisted on his point, and this was a shock for some and for others confusion. It definitely reduced the political tension among the Hizmet movement members, but it also created a lot of anger and disappointment among nationalists and Milli Görüş (political Islamists) members.
In my opinion, this incident provides one of the most important pieces of evidence that show the difference between the “political Islamist perspective” in Turkey and the “civil Islam” that the Hizmet movement seems to represent. Political Islamism strongly advocated a military response, while the civil Islam representatives were a bit more cautious before they reacted. Gülen prefers to stay away from politics, while political Islamism willingly champions a political cause even in the guise of charity.
To demonstrate my point, I will try to analyze some of the principles that Gülen and the Hizmet movement follow. This, I believe, will show that Gülen's comments were not political but clearly based on his own Hizmet principles.

The principles and integrity

It will be helpful to go over some of these principles and see where the difference between Gülen and the İHH lies. I also recognize the fact that these comments are about the way the campaign was organized rather than its core meaning (charity). In the very same article, Gülen tells us that he gave the same advice regarding methods to be employed when having charitable aims to another charity, Kimse Yok Mu, which delivers aid to the needy people in Gaza as well as other parts of the world.

Positive contribution

First, the flotilla was against the “positive contribution" principle that Gülen frequently emphasizes. Although the flotilla had set out to take aid to the Gaza Strip and to Palestinians who had been under a blockade for a long time, the operation was mainly aimed at creating awareness of the blockade or to impose pressure for a political solution to the blockade. An aid mission should aim to make the situation better rather than worse. In this case, defying the Israeli authorities and trying to force them to do something would not "lead to fruitful matters." This aid campaign did not contribute positively to the situation in Gaza but created nine additional direct victims, great injury, many more indirect victims (the families who lost loved ones) and new hostilities between Turkey and Israel. Thus, I think the flotilla's overall contribution is not greater than its negative outcomes.
Related to this principle, Gülen described such a scenario in one of his books, in which he argued that nobody has a right to perform an act of "heroism" (kahramanlik) at the expense of creating further troubles for others. He suggested avoiding any action that will not contribute towards solution of an issue but may create further problems.

Non-political activism

Another point that Gülen has criticized is that the İHH might have been politicized while organizing this aid campaign. Gülen believes that virtuous actions should be, ideally, carried out for the right reasons using the right methods. In this case, the political aims and outcomes of this flotilla are not clear, and this is a good reason for Gülen to distance himself from it. Gülen thinks that people have a responsibility to calculate the outcomes of their actions (especially in a highly political dispute such as the Israeli-Palestine conflict) and carry out their actions appropriately.

Law of the land

Gülen also believes that people should try to be respectful of the law of the land. When they do not agree with the law, then they should use democratic, peaceful and non-violent methods to change it without oppressing any other people while they are seeking their rights.

Respect for the ‘other'

Another relevant principle is Gülen's call for respect for the "other." As responsible people, according to Gülen, we should be looking for ways to achieve our aims that do not impose force on another but instead show respect for all people, their identity and their beliefs. The claim of respect for the "other" is generally accepted by everybody, but we tend to forget this principle when we are dealing with people with whom we do not agree.

Balance of action and outcomes

Another principle that is related to respect for the other is to separate struggle (in work or service) from achievement. Each person has a moral responsibility to do his best in order to achieve a moral goal but, according to Gülen, we are not responsible for creating outcomes; we are only responsible for working to achieve them.
Our efforts may not bring a successful outcome, but this does not mean that we should give up doing the right thing. In such a case, the right thing is to do your best to try to solve a problem in an area step by step. In this way, we may not bring a solution to a problem, but we can try to contribute to a solution using positive contribution (musbet hareket) methods rather than worsening the situation.

Legitimate goals with legitimate means

Gülen also suggests that legitimate goals should be pursued by legitimate means. The involvement of civil society in international politics, in international matters is limited and also is bound by the laws of each country. Requesting a state to change some of its policies may be a legitimate demand, but it should be pursued using legitimate means.

Responsibility of action and outcomes

Gülen has also claimed on many occasions that a moral agent is responsible for the outcomes of his actions. Gülen claims that the accountability may even include the unintended outcomes of an action. He refers to a verse in the Quran which claims that people will be confronted with things they had not taken into account (Surah Az-Zumar, 39;47). The organizers, although they may not have wished to cause some of the outcomes, still have some responsibility to bear as well as the other party responsible for the incident.

Civil Islam and political Islamism are different

In light of the above, I believe Gülen's response to the flotilla is consistent with his Hizmet principles. In other words, had Gülen's response to the Mavi Marmara incident been any different, this would have contradicted the main principles of Hizmet. Had he chosen to support the political outcomes of the flotilla, regardless of his own teachings, he may have gained some public support in the short term; however, he would have dismissed his own principles and would lose his ethical standards in the long term.
These comments also show that Gülen was able to have an individual opinion about a public debate and also express his opinions freely. Although these comments were not welcomed by the political authority, Gülen maintained his position and did not retract his comments. It is important that we can accommodate this as a sign of plurality in a democratic society.
What is more, Gülen follows the long-standing practice of previous Islamic scholars by offering independent views with political implications while remaining independent of any political party and ideology.
This incident also shows the difference between Gülen's and Erdoğan's vision, Milli Görüş and the Hizmet movement's philosophy, as well as the methodological difference between the Kimse Yok Mu charity and the İHH. If we want to understand what is really happening, we should get used to the fact that there are important differences between representatives that come from civil Islam and political Islam traditions in Turkey.

This article was published at TodaysZaman (16 January 2014)

http://www.todayszaman.com/news-336777-mavi-marmara-and-gulens-critics-politics-and-principles-by-ismail-mesut-sezgin-.html